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This Article considers whether differences in methods of judicial selection should
influence how judges approach statutory interpretation. Courts and scholars have not given this question much sustained attention, but most would probably embrace the “unified
model,” according to which appointed judges (such as federal judges) and elected judges
(such as many state judges) are supposed to approach statutory text in identical ways.
There is much to be said for the unified model—and we offer the first systematic defense
of it. But the Article also attempts to make the best case for the more controversial but also plausible contrary view: that elected judges and appointed judges should actually interpret statutes differently. We explain and defend that view and explore some of its implications and limits. We identify categories of cases in which the argument for interpretive
divergence is at its strongest. We also show how the possibility of interpretive divergence
might illuminate several specific doctrinal problems related to judicial federalism and judicial review of agency action.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of statutory interpretation focuses overwhelmingly on
federal courts, in particular the US Supreme Court. But most judges
are not federal judges, let alone Supreme Court Justices. The vast
majority of the judges in this country are state judges, and most of
those state judges have to do something that federal judges never
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have to do: face the voters in order to keep their jobs.1 Should this
difference in modes of judicial selection influence the enterprise of
statutory interpretation? Should elected judges read statutes differently than federal judges read statutes?
When scholars and jurists directly address these questions—
which is seldom2—the leading view seems to be that statutory interpretation should not differ according to the kind of judge doing the
interpreting. For instance, a recent essay by Professor Todd Rakoff
raises, but seemingly rejects, the possibility that elections should affect interpretive methodology. Professor Rakoff observes that much
thinking on statutory interpretation is based on the factual predicate
that “the statute is passed by a legislature that is democratically
elected, and it is interpreted by a court that is not.”3 That is, the unelected character of the interpreting judge is, on many accounts of
statutory interpretation, said to be of critical significance. Yet if the
unelected nature of the judge were really so important, Professor
Rakoff points out, “then we [would] need two completely separate
theories of statutory interpretation: one for jurisdictions where judges are elected, and one for where they are not.”4 And yet, he continues, “no one . . . actually carries the proposition to this logical conclusion.”5 This failure to follow the logic of interpretive divergence
convinces Professor Rakoff that the electoral status of a judge is not
important after all.6
Our aim in this Article is to see what would happen if one took
seriously the line of reasoning that links judicial selection to interpretive methodology in statutory cases. It may well be that statutory
1
About 90 percent of the judges on state appellate courts and trial courts of general
jurisdiction face the voters in some form of election. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to
States’ Judicial Selection, 95 Georgetown L J 1077, 1105 (2007).
2
As Professor David Pozen has recently observed in the context of constitutional decision making, the question of “whether a judge’s selection method ought to have any bearing on
how he or she decides cases” has “received little scholarly treatment” and is “surprisingly undertheorized.” David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum L
Rev 2047, 2052, 2083 (2010).
3
Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 Nw U L Rev
1559, 1571 (2010), citing Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
22 (Princeton 1997).
4
Rakoff, 104 Nw U L Rev at 1571 (cited in note 3).
5
Id at 1571–72. Although we believe ours to be the first systematic treatment of the subject of electorally driven divergence in statutory interpretation, we are aware of several instances in which the subject has been noted in passing without sustained analysis. See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr, Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials
on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 739–40 (West 4th ed 2007); Alex B.
Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal
Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 Ga L Rev 469, 502–03 (2006).
6
See Rakoff, 104 Nw U L Rev at 1571–72 (cited in note 3).
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interpretation is an activity that should be homogenous across
courts. And yet the possibility that interpretation by elected judges
should take a distinctive form should not be dismissed. Writing in
other contexts, some commentators have in fact argued that elected
judges should act differently than their unelected counterparts, in
particular that elected judges can properly employ looser justiciability doctrines7 and engage in more unapologetic constitutional judicial
review.8 Most recently, Professor David Pozen has discussed and critiqued the case for “majoritarian judicial review,” in which elected
judges act as conduits for implementing the public’s views of constitutional meaning.9 Some theorists of constitutional decision making
thus appear to take seriously the possibility of interpretive divergence, but most scholars of statutory interpretation seem curiously
content with (or just unaware that they have adopted) the view that
elections are irrelevant.
Yet, statutory interpretation is a particularly interesting field in
which to see how the logic of judicial elections plays out. Although
judges are public officials and ultimately owe their allegiance to the
people, the judicial role—in particular the judge’s orientation toward
the legislature—arguably varies depending on the type of case the
judge is deciding. In constitutional cases, the judge stands opposed to
the legislature, ever ready to strike down legislative attempts to
7
See, for example, Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking
the Judicial Function, 114 Harv L Rev 1833, 1882–98 (2001); Hans A. Linde, The State and the
Federal Courts in Governance: Vive la Différence!, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 1273, 1281–87
(2005). Linde’s position is hard to summarize easily because although he specifies many important differences in how state and federal judges do and should work, he also clearly claims
to “reject the thoughtless notion that a judge on an elective court should approach a legal issue
differently from an appointed colleague in a neighboring state.” Id at 1286. Although that passage is not explicitly addressed to statutory interpretation, it does seem to commit him to the
view that elections ultimately should not matter in that domain.
8
See, for example, Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits
of Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv L Rev 1131, 1137, 1157–59 (1999) (observing that judicial elections may reduce the need for deferential standards of review); Burt Neuborne, State
Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 Rutgers L J 881, 899–900 (1989) (arguing
that democratic elections allow state judges more leeway in exercising powers of judicial review); Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 Wash L Rev 19, 20 (1989) (“On
the state level, the debate about the proper scope of judicial review must alter because, unlike
the federal courts, state courts typically are democratically accountable.”). See also Mark
Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View from The Federalist Papers, 61 S Cal L Rev 1669, 1669, 1689 (1988) (describing the view that electoral accountability
and interpretive theories can act as substitutes, such that greater accountability licenses more
aggressive constitutional decision making); Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State
Constitutions 299, 313–56 (Oxford 2009) (describing ways in which state constitutional interpretation does and should differ from the federal model).
9
Pozen, 110 Colum L Rev at 2079–83, 2113–33 (cited in note 2).
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overstep the limitations the people set down in their governing charter.10 The relationship is not so confrontational in the realm of the
common law, though there the judge is still understood to act as a
rightfully independent actor. Things are quite different in statutory
interpretation, however, for here the traditional understanding of the
judicial role is that the judge is to act as the “faithful agent” of the
legislature.11 Much of the reason for this subordinate judicial role, on
the standard view, is that the legislature and not the judiciary is the
people’s elected policy-making body. The judges stand a step removed from the people in statutory cases, with the legislature mediating the relationship. And yet when the judge is popularly elected
and has a direct link to the people, the logic of legislative supremacy
and judicial subordination comes under strain. Or at least that is one
line of argument we will explore. In short, although there are some
respects in which the judicial role is similar across all types of cases—
and thus our discussion should hold interest for scholars of public
law generally—statutory interpretation has its own unique features
and therefore merits its own dedicated treatment.
Developing a satisfactory account of the interpretive duties and
opportunities of elected judges is becoming increasingly pressing
given developments in state judicial elections. The days when judicial
elections were nonevents are, according to many commentators, giving way to a world that is characterized by sharply contested elections and intense public involvement.12 If judicial elections are becoming more genuinely meaningful, does that give a winning judge a
mandate that an appointed judge lacks? If voters are willing and able
to throw judges out of office based on their decisions, should elected
judges incorporate public opinion into their decisions in a way that
life-tenured federal judges should not—and not just as a matter of
prudential self-preservation but also because doing so is the best way
to honor the logic of having the election in the first place? Or does
the logic of election mean something quite different: that the elected
judge should not see herself as an agent of the people who elected
her but rather as a very liberated trustee, who may use her interpretive freedom to lead the people? After all, if the judge extends

10

See note 57 (discussing the judicial role in constitutional cases).
See Parts I.A.3 and II.A.3 (describing the faithful-agent account).
12 Divining the nature of judicial elections—whether they create genuine accountability,
whether the voters’ decisions convey any real meaning—is a crucial part of formulating the
normative case for the significance or insignificance of judicial elections. It may be that at least
some judicial elections are becoming more like legislative elections, but this is a complicated
issue that we will address at some length in Parts I.B and II.B.1.
11
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herself too far outside the comfort zone of the people she serves, she
may be removed at the next election.
Because the interplay between judicial elections and statutory
interpretation remains largely uncharted terrain, this Article begins
by constructing the best cases for and against the proposition that
elections should influence interpretive method in statutory cases.
Part I presents the argument for the “unified model,” the view that
elections should not have any systematic effect on methods of statutory interpretation. The case for unified interpretation draws on several theoretical considerations, such as the nature of the judicial role
and the demands of the rule of law, but it also relies heavily on more
empirical and practical concerns about judicial elections. One of the
points we emphasize in Part I—and indeed the point is so important
that it bears stating here—is that it is not especially useful to speak of
“judicial elections” as a general phenomenon. There are several distinct mechanisms of judicial accountability that involve some sort of
election.13 Some state judges are elected in much the same way as legislators, namely through frequent partisan elections. Other judges
are initially appointed and then face the voters in infrequent retention elections that feature no competing candidate; the voters simply
vote up or down on whether to keep the incumbent. Still other judges face competitors but do so in elections without party labels, which
might decrease voter interest and understanding. Even elections that
are similar in terms of formal mechanisms can vary widely in their
practical significance. In short, there are elections and then there are
elections, and they might not have much in common apart from the
name.14 As we explain, it may be that only rarely would a judicial
election confer much in the way of a democratic pedigree that would
distinguish the elected judge from an unelected judge.
Switching sides, Part II then presents the case for an interpretive
regime in which elected and unelected judges could diverge somewhat in their interpretive methods. The case for divergence builds on
the idea that interpretation is an institution-specific activity. Just as
the best style of interpretation for administrative agencies might

13 See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and General
Jurisdiction Courts *3–11 (2011), online at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/
Judicial_Selection_Charts_1196376173077.pdf (visited Nov 20, 2012) (providing an overview of
state judicial selection methods).
14 That is, we reject a “unilocular” view of elections, even within the subcategory of judicial
elections. See Republican Party of Minnesota v White, 536 US 765, 805 (2002) (Ginsburg dissenting) (criticizing the majority for taking a “unilocular, ‘an election is an election’ approach”).
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depart from judicial norms,15 so too might different types of courts
diverge. Modes of selection represent, of course, just one dimension
along which various courts differ: they also vary in the resources at
their disposal, their place in the appellate hierarchy, and the broader
institutional contexts in which they are embedded—all of which
might bear on proper interpretive method.16 Nonetheless, electoral
status is a particularly salient variable, and it is our focus here. We
emphasize that electorally driven interpretive divergence need not
take one unique form. Part II thus presents not so much a single case
for a particular brand of divergence but rather a collection of arguments that offer varying support for distinct kinds of divergences.
Some versions of divergence emphasize elected judges’ duty to attend to public opinion, while others contemplate that elected judges
may enjoy a degree of interpretive freedom we might find democratically problematic for entrenched and unaccountable federal judges.17
That it is not immediately obvious what form divergence should take
(assuming it should exist at all) may go some way toward explaining
why it has not gained more adherents.
Parts I and II implicate deeply contentious issues surrounding
the nature of statutory interpretation and the proper role of courts in
a democracy, as well as disputed empirical questions about judicial
elections. We do not purport to settle these matters definitively in
this first systematic treatment of the subject. Nonetheless, having set
out the contending positions, in Part III we attempt to present some
implications and applications of the analysis. Although we do not
think that electorally driven divergence should be pervasive—not all
electoral systems will justify it, and not all cases will allow room for it
to operate—there are some situations in which it is a reasonably
compelling normative position. Part III identifies some categories of
cases in which the argument for divergence is at its strongest, such
as cases involving stale statutes, special-interest legislation, and
15 See Part II.A.6 (discussing the view that agency interpretation should differ from judicial interpretation).
16 In previous work, one of us has argued that a court’s location in the appellate hierarchy should affect methodology. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity:
How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L Rev 433, 458 (2012). In a similar vein,
Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski considers whether a court’s possession of general common law
powers should influence its approach to statutory interpretation. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 Tex L Rev *2 (forthcoming 2013), online at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2023527 (visited Nov 20, 2012).
17 Still another form of divergence would have elected judges hew especially closely to
the text in order to avoid charges of “activism.” We thank Professor Abbe Gluck for urging us
to consider this possibility. The various forms that divergence might take are explored in more
detail in Parts II and III.B.
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minority rights. Part III also shows how the analysis might illuminate
several specific doctrinal problems related to judicial federalism and
judicial review of agency action.
Finally, before proceeding with the analysis, a caveat is in order:
This Article is not about whether electing judges is a good idea.18
Whether or not elections are desirable, they are unlikely to go away
anytime soon. Thus we need a normative account of how elected
judges should judge, including in statutory interpretation cases, and
that account should take seriously the possibility that the internal
logic of judicial elections justifies or requires methodologies that depart from prevailing federal norms. However, for reasons we are
about to explore, those readers who are strongly opposed to judicial
elections of all kinds may find the argument for unified interpretation congenial precisely because it tends to minimize the significance
of the institutional arrangement they reject.
I. THE CASE FOR UNIFIED STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
To the limited extent that scholars have given any focused
thought to the question whether elected judges ought to interpret
statutes just like their appointed colleagues, the leading view is probably the unified approach, the view that modes of selection are normatively irrelevant.19 And that normative intuition finds tentative
support in existing judicial practice: although there are some variations in method from state to state, the judges themselves do not
seem to regard their electoral status as an important determinant of
their interpretive approach.20 Although few make the argument for
18 That question is the subject of significant public debate and a voluminous literature.
See, for example, American Bar Association, Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the American Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary 70 (American Bar Association 2003) (recommending reforms to state judicial selection
processes); Chris W. Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections 1–4
(Routledge 2009); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 Ohio St L J 43, 58–
72 (2003) (arguing that judicial elections undermine independence while failing to ensure accountability). Since her retirement from the Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has
become a leading critic of judicial elections. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Take Justice Off the
Ballot, NY Times A9 (May 23, 2010) (supporting a merit selection system instead of partisan
elections or lifetime appointments).
19 See notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
20 Given the large number of courts and cases, the tendency of methods to shift over
time, and the fact that assessments of judicial method are somewhat subjective, it is very hard
to make confident generalizations about judicial interpretive practices. In her recent study of
interpretive approaches in several states, Professor Gluck found some evidence of convergence
on a form of “modified textualism” but also found some differences across states. Abbe R.
Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and
the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L J 1750, 1772, 1812–14, 1858–61 (2010). Yet even
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such a unified approach beyond several sentences or a footnote, it is
worth specifying why this intuition has eclipsed potentially more nuanced arguments for tailoring statutory interpretation methodology
to varying modes of judicial selection.21
The case for the unified approach has three main elements: (A)
a collection of distinct but mutually reinforcing arguments based on
the nature of the judicial role, (B) an argument based on the limited
capacity of judicial elections to confer meaningful forms of accountability, and (C) an argument based on the practical difficulty of
translating election results into interpretive inputs. Although we will
show in Parts II and III that these arguments are probably not dispositive—or at least they are not dispositive in all cases—they help
make sense of the strong appeal of the unified approach.
A. Arguments from the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation
Supporters of unified interpretation need not all agree upon any
one particular theory of statutory interpretation. Indeed, a number
of otherwise quite disparate approaches to statutory interpretation
seem designed not to allow for any possibility that the judicial role
could differ between elected and appointed judges. Consider, for example, the view that judges should maximize wealth in society when
they interpret statutes;22 the view that judges should generally pursue
where there are differences, the judges themselves do not seem to believe that their electoral
status or other state-specific factors should drive divergence. See id at 1789–1800, 1804, 1860–
61 (noting that some state court opinions cite textualist opinions from the US Supreme Court
for propositions about statutory interpretation). See also Abner J. Mikva and Eric Lane, An
Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and the Legislative Process 3–4 (Aspen 1997)
(“[A]pproaches to statutory interpretation are not divisible into ‘state’ and ‘federal.’ Differences in interpretive approaches are the product of individual judicial sensibilities and not, for
the most part, particular jurisdictions.”).
21 In previous work, each of us has started to make the case for more nuanced approaches to statutory interpretation that vary based on the type of statute being interpreted and which
court is doing the interpreting. For examples of the former, see Ethan J. Leib and Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 Yale L J Online 47, 53–57 (2010),
online at http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/legislation/the-costs-of
-consensus-in-statutory-construction (visited Nov 20, 2012) (suggesting that different interpretative methods should be used for criminal statutes than are used for common law statutes);
Ethan J. Leib, Interpreting Statutes Passed through Referendums, 7 Election L J 49, 61 (2008)
(concluding that courts should use different methods for interpreting referendums than are
used for interpreting initiatives). For an example of the latter, see Bruhl, 97 Cornell L Rev at
458 (cited in note 16) (arguing that a court’s position in the appellate hierarchy should affect
how it interprets statutes).
22 This view might be attributed to a crude version of law and economics. Professor
Thomas Merrill calls the basic idea “welfarist.” Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative,
and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev 1565, 1572–74 (2010). Judge Richard Posner, a leading figure in both statutory interpretation and law and economics, holds a considerably
more sophisticated view. As he explains, a pragmatist judge concerned with bringing about
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the public good because they represent “the people” in a democracy;23 the view that judges should use the best account of political morality in deciding among plausible statutory meanings;24 the view that
interpretation is an empirical exercise in recovering historical facts
about word meanings or authorial intentions;25 the view that judges
must be modest because they are less institutionally competent to
develop law than other actors within the legal system because of
their limited task of adjudicating specific cases;26 and the view that
the very nature of a legal order with written laws requires judges to
be modest textualists of one form or another.27 This is not an exhaustive inventory of the theories of statutory interpretation, of course,
but each seems to lack a simple way to accommodate differences between elected and appointed judges because the theories tend to rely
on conceptions of the judicial role that apply equally to all types of
judges. Thus, despite long-standing disagreement regarding the
proper judicial role in statutory interpretation, people holding quite
different views can find common ground in the proposition that elections should not matter. The following Subsections explore a series
of considerations—rooted in values ranging from formalism to

good consequences might embrace a degree of formalism in statutory interpretation. See Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 13, 80 (Harvard 2008).
23 See, for example, Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet, and Michael Serota, A Fiduciary
Theory of Judging, 101 Cal L Rev *15 (forthcoming 2013), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2029001 (visited Nov 20, 2012) (describing judges as having fiduciary duties to the public). The
“fiduciary theory of judging” actually leaves room for interpretive divergence—but the thesis is
that both elected and appointed judges share a basic role and function within democratic systems. See id at *27.
24 See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 328–29 (Harvard 1985). This
is an oversimplification of Dworkin’s view, to be sure, since the resort to political morality for
Dworkin is permissible only when more traditional tools of statutory interpretation fail the
judge. See id.
25 Professor Larry Solum defines interpretation along these lines. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const Commen 95, 98–101 (2010). But,
importantly, he distinguishes the empirical-linguistic activity of “interpretation” from the subsequent task of “construction,” which is the normative activity of giving operational legal
meaning to texts. Id at 103–04. It seems that one could deny that electoral status should affect
interpretation but allow that it should affect construction. In that case, the significance of electoral status would depend on how strongly one believes linguistic meaning contributes to and
constrains legal meaning.
26 See, for example, Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv L Rev
353, 392, 394–404 (1978); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U Chi L Rev 883,
906–11 (2006).
27 See, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 17 (cited in note 3). But see John
F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum L Rev 1, 58–70 (2001) (arguing that specific features of the federal Constitution lead to textualism’s correctness, which
leaves open the possibility that different state constitutions could lead to a different method of
statutory interpretation for state judiciaries).
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pragmatism to institutional competence—and explain how they converge on a unified approach to statutory interpretation.
1. Formalism and “separation-of-powers essentialism.”
On the standard account of the judicial role, judges may exercise
only formally “judicial” powers, not legislative or executive powers.
This role-differentiated division of labor derives, of course, from
constitutional text. Article III of the US Constitution confers upon
federal judges the “judicial Power” of the United States—and not
the “legislative Power[],” which is granted to Congress, or the “executive Power,” which is vested in the President.28 Those textual strictures do not apply to state governments, but states have their own
constitutions that divide powers in similar ways. Indeed, in some
states the separation-of-powers language is even more “essentialist,”
expressly forbidding one branch from exercising power conferred
upon another.29 The judicial power is, conventionally, the authority
“to say what the law is.”30 In the statutory interpretation context, that
involves determining what the words of a statute mean within the
fabric of the law.31 This constrained notion of the judicial role also
finds support in extratextual sources such as comparative institutional analysis: the legislative body has competencies and resources that
support better lawmaking, while judicial bodies have expertise and
education that facilitate better legal analysis and applications of rules
to individual cases.32
The formalist emphasizes that what is usually referred to as the
“judicial power” is actually equally a judicial duty. The judicial duty,
on this view, is “to decide [cases] in accord with the law of the
land.”33 Such a duty, importantly, is inherent in the office, irrespective

28

US Const Art III, § 1; US Const Art I, § 1; US Const Art II, § 1.
See, for example, Cal Const Art 3, § 3 (“The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise
either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.”); Tex Const Art 2, § 1 (“[N]o
person, or collection of persons, being of one of these [legislative, executive, or judicial] departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.”). But see Part II.A.1 (suggesting that state constitutions
might contemplate a more capacious notion of judicial power).
30 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
31 See West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc v Casey, 499 US 83, 100–01 (1991) (“Where
a statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that
permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously
and subsequently enacted law.”).
32 See note 26 and accompanying text (noting limitations on judicial lawmaking stemming from the nature of case-by-case adjudication).
33 Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 101 (Harvard 2008).
29
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of selection methods. The formalist believes that the judge’s duty is
to express an impartial judgment about statutory meaning—not the
judgment of her selectors, appointing president, appointing governor, or constituents.34 The unified approach is a natural outgrowth of
this commitment to role, office, and duty. To summarize, “judges are
selected, one way or another, to act like judges, a role whose specifications does not depend on the presence or absence of popular
election.”35
2. Rule-of-law considerations.
The judicial role is not just a product of particular bits of constitutional text and foundationalist thinking about the separation of
powers. Rather, the proper judicial role also derives from more general political-theoretic and pragmatic rule-of-law considerations.
The rule of law is a multifaceted concept,36 but several aspects of
it seem to support the unified approach to statutory interpretation.
One important strand of the rule of law emphasizes the importance
of stability and predictability: The law should not oscillate wildly,
and when the law does change, the change should be announced to
all parties ahead of time. If the idea of interpretive divergence is that
elected judges may more readily depart from clear texts and settled
precedent, those rule-of-law values would come under threat. What
becomes of stare decisis in a world where newly elected judges may
change the law?
But even assuming that divergence instead operates in a more
restrained fashion, limited to hard cases where the law is already unclear, a methodology that makes elections relevant would still
threaten other rule-of-law values like independence and impersonality. The independent judgment traditionally expected of judges seems
to require indifference to election results or electoral threats in
statutory interpretation decisions just as in all others.37 The electoral
34

See id at 148–78.
Rakoff, 104 Nw U L Rev at 1572 (cited in note 3). Rakoff is not an interpretive formalist—but he does believe that the common nature of the judicial role trumps any differences
between elected and unelected judges. See id at 1571–72, 1575–76.
36 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 38–39 (Yale rev ed 1969) (listing formal requirements of valid law); Richard H. Fallon Jr, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum L Rev 1, 7–9 (1997) (listing features typically associated with the
rule of law); Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, in James E.
Fleming, ed, Getting to the Rule of Law 3, 4–5 (New York 2011) (distinguishing between formal, substantive, and procedural understandings of the rule of law).
37 There is evidence that various types of electoral pressures do influence judicial decisions. See, for example, Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 Stan L Rev 1629,
35
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endangerment of the judicial role is especially grave if one believes
that judges, as trustees of the whole public interest, need to have the
backbone to stand up to majority sentiment from time to time in order to protect unpopular groups and litigants.38
True, one might contend that the decision to elect judges shows
that the polity has embraced a different vision of judging, a different
balance of rule-of-law values. Yet we might very well conclude that
even in a state that elects its judges, the voters’ most important desire is a “meta-intent” that judges should not pay attention to specific
public preferences other than the preference that judges decide independently in accordance with law.39 “The people,” one might reasonably think, do not want their judges to act as politicians—even
when they are politicians—and so sociological legitimacy might encourage the unified approach to statutory interpretation. In any case,
to whatever extent one believes judges in a democracy should in fact
pay some attention to specific majoritarian preferences in interpreting
ambiguities in statutory language,40 it is not at all clear that such an
1659–71 (2010) (discussing political pressures that affect state judges); Amanda Frost and
Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 Va L Rev 719, 732–40 (2010)
(surveying the empirical evidence of electoral influences); Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence
of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J Legal Stud 169, 171 (2009) (“[T]he voting of state
supreme court judges is strongly associated with the stereotypical preferences of the retention
agents.”). Recent case studies have also highlighted the impact of campaign contributions on
case outcomes. See, for example, Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A
Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J L & Polit 645, 646 (1999) (studying the effect
of campaign contributions on judicial decisions in 1990s Alabama); Adam Liptak and Janet
Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, NY Times A1 (Oct 1, 2006) (asserting that justices on the Supreme Court of Ohio “voted in favor of contributors 70 percent of
the time”). Nonetheless, the empirical evidence concerning the effect of judicial elections is
complex and still evolving. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Part I.B.
38 See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U Chi L Rev 689, 694, 727–29 (1995).
39 See Jordan M. Singer, The Mind of the Judicial Voter, 2011 Mich St L Rev 1443, 1465
(contending that voters make decisions primarily based on judges’ fairness, impartiality, and
commitment to procedural regularity rather than based on agreement with policy views). But
see James L. Gibson, Judging the Politics of Judging: Are Politicians in Robes Inevitably Illegitimate?, in Charles Gardner Geyh, ed, What’s Law Got to Do with It? What Judges Do, Why
They Do It, and What’s at Stake 281, 289 table 11.1 (Stanford 2011) (reporting survey results
showing that a significant majority of respondents want judges just to follow the law, though
substantial numbers also report that they want judges to reflect the voters’ views). Note that
this is different from the claim that elected judges should be especially cautious and formalistic
to avoid even the whiff of activism: this latter claim would actually be a claim for interpretive
divergence. See Part II.A.5 (discussing such a form of divergence).
40 A broad variety of accounts envision some role for majority preferences. See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 349 (Harvard 1986) (taking into account “the character
and spread of public opinion”); William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 152
(Harvard 1994) (suggesting that the preferences of the current Congress are relevant to interpreting statutes passed by a previous Congress); Posner, How Judges Think at 136–37
(cited in note 22) (arguing that, subject to qualifications, majority preferences affecting judicial
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obligation depends on whether a judge is elected or appointed: both
elected and appointed judges may have responsibilities to popular
will in democratic governance.41 The same is true of those who believe that the judicial office and the rule of law require some attention
to “natural” rights, irrespective of judicial selection mechanisms.42
The interplay between judicial elections and the judicial role is
on prominent display in the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisom v
Roemer.43 The question there was whether, within the meaning of a
portion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,44 elected state judges were
“representatives.”45 The Court divided over the question, and each
side mounted a long and elaborate explanation of why its reading of
the statute was best. But complicated textual, constitutional, and
precedential analysis aside, one gets the sense that much of the driving force behind the dispute arose from a clash between two differing
views of the judicial role.46 The majority acknowledged the vision of
judging in which the judge is beholden to no one, represents no one,
and is indifferent to public opinion.47 Yet when a state decides to
elect its judges, the majority said, the state necessarily embraces a
different view of the judicial role, one in which judges, no less than
legislators and governors, are indeed “representatives” of the electorate.48 For the majority, mode of selection mattered. For Justice
Antonin Scalia in dissent, however, the mode of selection did not affect the nature of the judicial role. The elected judge does not act on
behalf of the people: “[T]he judge represents the Law—which often
requires him to rule against the People.”49 Although this view did not
decisions can be good in a democratic society); Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and
Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U Ill L Rev 1103, 1105, 1115–22 (proposing a
method of statutory interpretation that would incorporate “the understanding and expectations of the contemporary public as to the law’s meaning and application”).
41 See Leib, Ponet, and Serota, 101 Cal L Rev at *27 (cited in note 23).
42 See generally Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford
2011) (arguing that the best conception of the rule of law requires judges to protect natural law
and natural rights).
43 501 US 380 (1991).
44 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1973 et seq.
45 Chisom, 501 US at 398–99.
46 For a thoughtful treatment of some of the jurisprudential issues at play in Chisom, see
Michael Herz, Choosing between Normative and Descriptive Versions of the Judicial Role, 75
Marq L Rev 725, 738–45 (1992). There were other concerns at work, too. This was a voting
rights case in which black voters in the South were claiming that the state legislature had drawn
judicial districts in order to dilute their franchise. Chisom, 501 US at 384–85.
47 See Chisom, 501 US at 400–01.
48 Id.
49 Id at 410–11 (Scalia dissenting). For an argument that judges are trustees for the law,
see Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity for Virtue,
62 Wash & Lee L Rev 1637, 1639–40 (2005).
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prevail within the complicated context of Chisom itself, it commands
support as a more general matter—and not just among those with
conservative and formalist sensibilities like Justice Scalia. Even those
who disagree with Justice Scalia’s specific statutory conclusion in
Chisom could still be drawn to the view that federal and state judges
are essentially alike, insofar as they represent “the Law” first and
foremost, irrespective of their mode of selection.50 Indeed, even the
Chisom majority confessed “that ideally public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge’s role.”51 This widely embraced understanding
of the judicial role surely goes a long way toward explaining the
power of the unified approach to statutory interpretation: it appeals
not just to formalists but also to pragmatists concerned with stability,
sociological legitimacy, and the rule of law.52
3. Judges’ relationship to the enacting legislature in statutory
interpretation cases.
Moving away from specifications of the judicial role as a matter
of general political, constitutional, and democratic theory, a more
particularized account of that role has emerged within the field of
statutory interpretation. Typically, judges are supposed to be the enacting legislature’s “faithful agents.”53 It is not, conventionally, the
judge’s job to be subservient to the current legislature’s view.54 Rather, the task is to implement—deferentially but independently—the
enacting legislature’s instructions as supreme. And if it is the judge’s
job to divine, reconstruct, or promote legislative intent and will
(whether that means hewing closely to text or instead attending to
50 See, for example, Republican Party of Minnesota v White, 536 US 765, 806 (2002)
(Ginsburg dissenting) (“Judges, however, are not political actors. They do not sit as representatives of particular persons, communities, or parties; they serve no faction or constituency.”).
51 Chisom, 501 US at 400.
52 It is likely that those who strongly oppose judicial elections do so for many of the same
reasons—and may, therefore, be drawn to the unified approach to statutory interpretation as a
second-best accommodation. For our purposes here, we take elections as they come and do
not provide any analysis of the normative question of whether judicial elections are desirable.
53 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 415,
435 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts in statutory
construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature. . . . The judicial task is to discern
and apply a judgment made by others, most notably the legislature.”). See also Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Georgetown L J 281, 283–94 (1989)
(discussing the related concept of legislative supremacy). As we discuss in Part II.A.3, there are
different kinds of faithful-agent approaches, which vary in how tightly the interpreting court is
bound to its legislative superior’s instructions.
54 But see Bertrall L. Ross II, Against Constitutional Mainstreaming, 78 U Chi L Rev
1203, 1238–39 (2012) (arguing that courts should interpret statutes in accordance with contemporary majoritarian preferences in the legislature).
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more general purposes), the method by which the judge ascended to
the bench would seem to be irrelevant to the task. If the principal inquiry in statutory cases is discovery of the will of the legislature, the
status of the judge herself—whether elected or appointed—does not
change the terrain. Or so one could argue with some plausibility.
Further, the logic of the faithful-agent account does not seem to
be sensitive to the matter of who holds the power to select, control,
and remove judges. In the federal system, the power to appoint belongs to the Senate and the President, and the power to remove belongs to the House and the Senate together; the people have no direct role.55 Yet we are not aware of any judge or commentator who
relies on these facts about judicial selection to explain why federal
judges (or similarly selected state judges) should act as the enacting
legislature’s faithful agent.56 Moreover, it is worth observing that the
removal power is not limited to statutory contexts. A legislature may
remove judges in connection with common law and constitutional
law cases as well—yet the faithful-agent theory applies only to statutory cases.57 Thus, if the justification for the faithful-agent theory
does not refer to the judges’ conditions of employment or vulnerability to external control, changing those variables by implementing judicial elections should not change the contours of the job. This is another reason to endorse the unified model.

55

US Const Art II, § 2 (appointment); US Const Art I, §§ 2–3 (impeachment).
Less likely still would be a claim that a federal judge interpreting statutes should act as
the faithful agent of the appointing president. Consider Gray Davis, one-time governor of California, who said this of judges he appointed: “They’re there because I appointed them and they
need to keep faith with my electoral mandate. Otherwise, democracies don’t work. . . . My appointees should reflect my views. They are not there to be independent agents.” Dan Smith,
Davis’ Remarks Leave Judges’ Heads Shaking, Sacramento Bee A1 (Mar 2, 2000). To be sure,
presidents and governors choose judges in part based on an expectation that the judge will implement the executive’s values—and some judges might in fact privately take that as part of
their mission. But this is not publicly expressed as a normative theory of judicial duty in interpreting statutes; when it is, as in Gray Davis’s case, it provokes outrage. See id (reporting the
angry reaction to Davis’s remarks and his subsequent backpedaling).
57 Consider the standard account of constitutional judicial review in Federalist 78:
56

[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the
legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned
to their authority. . . . It therefore belongs to [judges] to ascertain [the Constitution’s] meaning . . . . If there should happen to be an irreconcileable variance between the two . . . the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention
of the people to the intention of their agents.
Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521, 525 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
The point here is that in constitutional law, the judge serves as an agent for the people—or at
least the people when acting in their historic Constitution-forging capacity—not the legislature.
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The Pseudoaccountability of Judges in Judicial Elections?

Even assuming there were sound theoretical grounds for distinguishing the interpretive duties of elected judges from those of their
appointed colleagues, there is still a real question about whether judicial elections confer the sort of democratic legitimacy that might
warrant disrupting a presumptively unified role. Putting aside the
view that judicial elections are normatively undesirable precisely because they threaten to influence judicial behavior improperly,58 there
is good reason to think that many or most judicial elections lack
some of the qualities that ordinarily give elections their legitimating
power.
To begin, judicial elections tend not to involve the kind of public
participation that we usually associate with democratically meaningful contests. Now, that claim might initially seem surprising, for judicial elections have recently gained new visibility for even casual
readers of newspapers (to say nothing of those who read political
science journals or law reviews).59 Perhaps the most notable example
comes from Iowa, where several incumbent members of the state supreme court were ousted in 2010 in response to their decision recognizing a right to same-sex marriage.60 But it is worth keeping this new
visibility in perspective. To wit, prior to the very recent electoral battles in several states, the leading example of a visible judicial election
to which most people could point was a well-known 1986 judicial
retention election in California, when Californians refused to return three state supreme court justices to their offices.61 More commonly, however, elections have gone mostly unnoticed by the electorate and have not been a source of great interest or contestation.62
58 See notes 37–38 and accompanying text. But see Part II.A.5 (arguing that responsive
judiciaries can further some rule-of-law values).
59 For some reflections on these recent developments, see Bonneau and Hall, In Defense
of Judicial Elections at 3–4, 10–11 (cited in note 18); Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial
Election: Appropriate Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46 Ct Rev 118, 120–24 (2011); David E. Pozen, What Happened in Iowa?, 111 Colum L Rev Sidebar 90, 91–93 (2011), online at
http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/90_Pozen.pdf (visited Nov 20,
2012). Schotland examines 2010 judicial elections in Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
and Kansas. Schotland, 46 Ct Rev at 118–20 n 3 (cited in note 59). Even more recently there
have been expensive and closely watched judicial elections in Michigan and Wisconsin. See
Brady Dennis, PACs, Donors Shaping Judicial Elections, Wash Post A1 (Mar 30, 2012).
60 See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, NY Times A1
(Nov 4, 2010).
61 For a meditation on that election by one of the justices who was ousted, see Joseph R.
Grodin, In Pursuit of Justice: Reflections of a State Supreme Court Justice 162–86 (California 1989).
62 See Philip L. Dubois, From Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections and the Quest for Accountability 36 (Texas 1980); Geyh, 64 Ohio St L J at 53 (cited in note 18). Admittedly, it is
possible that judicial elections inspire little public contestation precisely because the public is
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Furthermore, even when the elections are noticed, they are probably
poorly understood: the “voter ignorance” problem that plagues most
democratic elections63 is likely even more severe in judicial elections
because understanding judicial action generally requires special expertise and professional education.64 Given the public’s historically
large-scale indifference to judicial elections, it is hard to argue that
they matter enough to justify a departure from a unified approach to
statutory interpretation. Ultimately, though, the extent to which
elections matter to the public raises empirical questions to which we
do not yet have definitive answers.65
Beyond the empirics, any assessment of the democratic value of
judicial elections also requires that one remember that judicial elections comprise a varied group of institutions. Although about 90 percent of state judges face some type of election, only about one-third
compete in partisan elections that mirror elections for executive and
legislative office.66 Instead, the majority faces either retention or
nonpartisan elections.67 These latter two kinds of elections—and retention elections in particular—seem to be poor mechanisms for
fostering accountability.68 For example, in a study of 3,912 judicial
broadly in agreement with—rather than ignorant of—what judges are doing. And it is also possible that there is a core attentive public that pays careful attention and that low voting rates
(or high rolloff rates) do not tell us that there is no accountability.
63 See generally Ilya Somin, Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance, 22 Critical
Rev 253 (2010) (arguing that widespread ignorance among voters creates problems for deliberative democracy).
64 See David W. Neubauer, Judicial Process: Law, Courts, and Politics in the United
States 144–45 (1991); Anthony Champagne and Greg Thielemann, Awareness of Trial Court
Judges, 74 Judicature 271, 271 (1991); Marie Hojnacki and Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial
Candidates: How Voters Explain Their Decisions, 75 Judicature 300, 301 (1992).
65 For a recent summary of the empirical evidence, see Chris W. Bonneau, A Survey of
Empirical Evidence Concerning Judicial Elections 5 (Federalist Society Mar 14, 2012), online at
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20120719_Bonneau2012WP.pdf (visited Nov 20, 2012).
66 To win their initial terms in office, 33 percent of appellate judges and 38 percent of
trial judges run in partisan elections. For subsequent terms, even fewer face partisan elections:
25 percent of appellate judges and 29 percent of trial judges. See Schotland, 95 Georgetown L J
at 1092 (cited in note 1).
67 Forty-two percent of appellate judges and 19 percent of trial-level judges face retention elections, and 20 percent of appellate judges and 41 percent of trial-level judges face nonpartisan elections. See id at 1105. See also text accompanying notes 13–14 (describing different
electoral systems). Even where a jurisdiction has competitive elections as a formal matter, the
on-the-ground reality might differ. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court is an “elected”
court, yet the majority of the justices initially gain their seats through gubernatorial appointments to vacancies, and most of the elections are uncontested. See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Judicial
Communication, Elections, and the Oregon Supreme Court, 46 Willamette L Rev 479, 481–82
(2010). See also Bonneau and Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections at 87–89 (cited in note 18)
(providing data on differences across the states in the competitiveness of judicial elections).
68 Here again, there is lots of empirical evidence to evaluate, much of which urges that
public opinion has a substantial influence on the decision making of judges subject to retention
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retention elections spanning a 30-year period, only 50 judges (about
1 percent) were defeated.69 The high likelihood that a judge will win a
retention election goes beyond even the usual incumbency advantage in US legislative elections, which is already very large.70 Further evidence that retention elections have limited value as a barometer of democratic mandates can be adduced from “rolloff” rates, the
rate at which voters voting for other offices simply leave their vote
for judicial office blank. In the same thirty-year study cited above,
more than one-third of voters “rolled off.”71 So what looks superficially like an altogether different accountability mechanism from the
federal system of life tenure is actually—Iowa in 2010 notwithstanding—quite similar to federal job security.
Contested nonpartisan elections are in some ways better than
retention systems at approximating democratic preferences, but they
have substantial defects of their own. In particular, the absence of
party labels can deprive voters of the information that might contribute to more rational decisions.72 Without knowledge, understanding,
and nonpartisan elections. See, for example, Brandice Canes-Wrone and Tom S. Clark, Judicial Independence and Nonpartisan Elections, 2009 Wis L Rev 21, 52–65 (finding that judges
subject to partisan elections are more independent from public opinion than judges subject to
nonpartisan elections); Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark, and Jee-Kwang Park, Judicial
Independence and Retention Elections, 28 J L, Econ, & Org 211, 224–30 (2012) (finding that
retention elections do not completely insulate judges from public opinion).
69 See Larry Aspin and William K. Hall, Thirty Years of Judicial Retention Elections: An
Update, 37 Soc Sci J 1, 3–4, 8 (2000). More than half of those defeated (twenty-eight) were in
Illinois, which sets its retention threshold at 60 percent; only one judge in Illinois received less
than a 50 percent affirmative vote in that period. Id at 8–10.
70 For example, in recent decades members of the US House of Representatives have
usually won reelection over 90 percent of the time. See David C. Huckabee, ed, Reelection
Rates of Incumbents 23 figure 1, 27 table 1 (Novinka 2003); Historical Elections: Reelection
Rates over the Years (Center for Responsive Politics), online at http://www.opensecrets.org/
bigpicture/reelect.php (visited Nov 20, 2012). These high congressional reelection rates reflect
in part the effects of partisan gerrymandering of districts. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv L Rev 593, 624 (2002). Yet the judges in retention systems manage to do better even though many of them run in nongerrymandered, natural constituencies like states or counties. It bears noting, however, that reelection rates for all offices
are pushed higher by the fact that some officeholders at risk of losing do not seek reelection.
71 See Aspin and Hall, 37 Soc Sci J at 12 (cited in note 69). Aspin and Hall detected a
slight decrease in rolloff over time, but it remained close to one-third even in the last period of
the study, 1986–94. Id.
72 For some discussion about the ways in which political parties might ameliorate
knowledge deficits in mass democracy, see Ethan J. Leib and Christopher S. Elmendorf, Why
Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and Popular Democrats Need Parties, 100 Cal L
Rev 69, 86 (2012) (“The labeling of candidates according to party suggests the candidates’ likely policy positions and tells voters whether any given candidate will join or work against the
dominant coalition.”). The usefulness of party signals suggests that partisan judicial elections
might be better at producing democratic mandates than nonpartisan races. See Brian F.
Schaffner, Matthew Streb, and Gerald Wright, Teams without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections, 54 Polit Rsrch Q 7, 9 (2001) (finding higher incumbent effects
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or reasonable heuristics, elections in the judicial context can be quite
limited sources of democratic meaning. And yet partisan elections
have become relatively rare: only seven states have them now, compared with twenty in 1960.73
To be sure, things may be changing and we might be living
through a seismic shift in the politics of judicial elections. The handful of high-profile elections of recent years might be a harbinger of
things to come. Judicial elections might be getting better in some respects: more salient, more competitive, more meaningful.74 Nonetheless, at least as of today, vigorously contested judicial elections seem
to be limited to state supreme courts, bypassing the hundreds of
judges who engage in statutory interpretation in their daily jobs in
the lower courts.75 If elections should matter to a judge’s work in
statutory interpretation, perhaps it should be only for the judges
whose elections mattered to their constituents.76 Even if constituents
and lower turnout in nonpartisan elections); Gerald C. Wright, Charles Adrian and the Study of
Nonpartisan Elections, 61 Polit Rsrch Q 13, 13–14 (2008) (finding that voters use less principled
heuristics in nonpartisan elections). See also Cindy D. Kam, Implicit Attitudes, Explicit Choices: When Subliminal Priming Predicts Candidate Preference, 29 Polit Beh 343, 344–45 (2007)
(reporting that party cues in judicial retention elections can eradicate racial bias). But see
Richard P. Caldarone, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and Tom S. Clark, Partisan Labels and Democratic Accountability: An Analysis of State Supreme Court Abortion Decisions, 71 J Polit 560,
571 (2009) (finding that state judges chosen in nonpartisan elections track median voter preferences more closely than do judges selected through partisan races); Herbert M. Kritzer, Change in
State Supreme Court Elections: Is Voting Becoming More Partisan? *16 (University of Minnesota
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 11-29, July 2011), online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1879952 (visited Nov 20, 2012) (arguing that nonpartisan elections are becoming
more partisan). For some recent analysis of this literature, see Christopher S. Elmendorf and
David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013
U Ill L Rev *23–25 (forthcoming), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2010115 (visited Nov 20, 2012).
73 See Bonneau and Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections at 9 (cited in note 18).
74 See notes 146–48 and accompanying text (suggesting that at least some judicial elections have become more meaningful).
75 See Matthew J. Streb, How Judicial Elections Are Like Other Elections and What That
Means for the Rule of Law, in Geyh, ed, What’s Law Got to Do with It? 195, 197–98 (cited in
note 39). One of us takes a more careful look at what we can know about elections for lowerlevel judgeships. See Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U Pa L Rev *9–30
(forthcoming 2013), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2159704 (visited Nov 20, 2010).
76 Although Professors Chris Bonneau and Melinda Hall adduce plenty of evidence to
suggest that elections are meaningful and capable of holding judges accountable, they concede
that they investigate only the highest-level judges in their empirical analysis. Bonneau and
Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections at 18–19 (cited in note 18). Moreover, in the latest and
widest-ranging study of competitiveness in state supreme court judicial elections, Professor
Herbert Kritzer found that between 1946 and 2009, competitiveness was basically stable (with
the apparent increase attributable to the decline of the one-party South). See Herbert M.
Kritzer, Competitiveness in State Supreme Court Elections, 1946–2009, 8 J Empirical Legal Stud
237, 255 (2011).
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identify with their judicial “representatives” on a local trial court,
that may not be a function of a competitive election in the vast majority of cases, so one could argue that the election itself should not
do any work in licensing the judge to diverge from what judges in
nonelective jurisdictions do.
C.

The Practical Limitations of Elections for Statutory
Interpretation

Even if one looked past the democratic deficits of many judicial
elections, there is a set of practical limitations that hinder any attempt to translate judicial elections into useful input for statutory interpretation decisions.
First, if the idea behind interpretive divergence is that elections
represent communication between the people and their judicial
“representatives,”77 elections may not convey information specific
enough to be of much use. In theory, a judicial election could—if salient enough—come close to being a referendum on a single issue or
on methodology generally.78 But the likelihood that an election has
the focus to illuminate a hard question of statutory interpretation
(the kind of case that would require a judge to do something more
than read the text of the statute and look at some precedent or other
obviously authoritative source of statutory meaning) is very small indeed. Elections are opaque to begin with; reading elections to clarify
a subtle ambiguity in a statutory text that was probably never mentioned in the election is hugely difficult. If such an election existed—or a statute or methodology was at the center of an election
campaign—perhaps it would make sense to take account of it when
and if the opportunity presented itself. But the rarity of such elections and campaigns surely contributes to the general case for the
unified method.79
Second, although it is true that increased spending in judicial
elections can help mobilize voters and reinforce the resonance of
77 The advocate of divergence might embrace such a view, but other, more indirect
pathways of influence are possible too. See notes 139–43 and accompanying text.
78 For some evidence that elections for judges can actually be “about” methodology as a
whole, see Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1808–11 (cited in note 20). For a skeptical take on whether
elections convey specific information to judges, see Pozen, 110 Colum L Rev at 2119–22 (cited
in note 2).
79 Consider the well-known difficulty of determining voter intent in elections on specific
initiatives, where such intent has authoritative status and where the voters were focused on a
single statute when casting their ballots. See Leib, 7 Election L J at 49 (cited in note 21) (reviewing the principles of statutory interpretation for direct democracy). Then consider the
obviously greater difficulty a judge would have divining voter intent on a statute when that
statute was very far from the mind of the voter in a general election for a judicial candidate.
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judicial campaigns for the average citizen,80 there is certainly a risk
that the increased spending in these elections has other consequences too. To wit, if money is pouring into judicial elections from funding sources outside the state,81 there is a reasonable concern that election results are being driven by concerns that do not actually emerge
from within local politics. If the agenda is set from outside, it is hard
to justify paying too much heed to that agenda in local judicial decision making. And even if the money is being raised locally, one
might hesitate to give too much normative weight to elections that
are—to put it plainly—purchased.82 Judges, one might think, are supposed to provide the last stand against those who can buy their laws
at the legislative level. Again, those who oppose judicial elections on
the ground that they put justice up for sale to the highest bidder have
quite a powerful argument against having judicial decision making
turn on the election returns.
Finally, elected judges must often interpret statutes that originate in jurisdictions outside their electoral constituency. State supreme
courts must decide questions of federal statutory interpretation and
local trial courts may need to decide statewide issues. In these jurisdiction-crossing cases, it is very hard to see how local elections and
local constituents, even when their views are discernable, ought to
control questions of statutory interpretation that have much broader
application.83
***
The appeal of the unified model is intuitive—and it is supported
by a range of arguments, both jurisprudential and practical. It is hard
80

See Bonneau and Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections at 20–48 (cited in note 18).
For a discussion of out-of-state financing of judicial elections, see Pozen, 111 Colum L
Rev Sidebar at 93–94 (cited in note 59); Schotland, 95 Georgetown L J at 1099 n 93 (cited in
note 59). The overwhelming bulk of the independent expenditures in the campaign to oust the
Iowa Supreme Court Justices came from out-of-state groups. See Linda Casey, Independent
Expenditure Campaigns in Iowa Topple Three High Court Justices table 1 (National Institute
on Money in State Politics Jan 10, 2011), online at http://www.followthemoney.org/press/
PrintReportView.phtml?r=440 (visited Nov 20, 2012).
82 See, for example, Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Co, 556 US 868, 872–73 (2009) (reversing a state supreme court decision on due process grounds where campaign contributions created the appearance of bias). See also note 37 (citing sources documenting how electoral pressures influence judicial decisions). Although partisan judicial elections are the ones most likely
to have democratic credibility, apparently they are also the ones most liable to be corrupted by
campaign contributions. See Michael S. Kang and Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of
Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 NYU L
Rev 69, 107 (2011). Thus, it might be just in those elections where considerations of sociological
legitimacy would most strongly militate in favor of curtailing any special discretion.
83 For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Part III.C.
81

01 BRUHL & LEIB ART (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/11/2013 8:27 AM

Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation

1237

to envision one set of statutory interpretation principles that applies
only to federal judges—and then a separate set of principles for
elected judges. Adding further complexity, the category of elected
judges itself contains several distinct classes of judges (retained judges, judges subject to partisan election, judges subject to nonpartisan
election, and hybrids thereof), whose approaches may all have to differ if one took electoral differences seriously in the enterprise of
statutory interpretation. Indeed, if we took electoral differences really seriously, would we need to scrutinize each election separately?
Would judges who win in landslides be entitled to interpret differently from those who squeak through with 51 percent of the vote?
Avoiding that sort of complexity counts as its own reason to favor
the unified model. But now that we have presented the considerations that could justify unified interpretation, let us see how that approach fares once we construct the best case for the contrary view.
II. THE CASE FOR INTERPRETIVE DIVERGENCE(S)
We turn now to presenting the case for why elected judges’
methods of statutory interpretation should differ from the methods
of their unelected colleagues. Although interpretive divergence is
not the prevailing view today, it should not be dismissed out of hand.
A more nuanced, judge-specific approach to statutory interpretation
in fact has a number of virtues. It makes sense of the existence of judicial elections and finds support in the internal logic of several leading accounts of statutory interpretation. It takes advantage of the
special practical competencies of elected judiciaries. And nothing in
the nature of the judicial power or the rule of law necessarily forbids it.
The argument for the unified model did not require a commitment to any particular approach to statutory interpretation. That is,
one could largely set aside many longstanding interpretive debates—
textualism versus purposivism, pragmatism versus formalism, and so
forth—and simply say that methods of selection do not alter the argumentative terrain. One cannot be quite so agnostic about substance when making the case for interpretive divergence: the reason
judges should diverge is that one kind of judge should follow one approach and another kind of judge should follow another. So how
should elected judges differ in their interpretive approaches from
their unelected counterparts?
As it happens, we do not believe that divergence, if justified at
all, has to take one uniquely correct form. Rather, one can construct
arguments for a few distinct kinds of divergence, which could operate
as either complements or alternatives to one another. These different
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forms of divergence will be more fully developed below. One possibility is that elected judges may enjoy a relatively greater liberty to
interpret statutes in ways that go beyond or even against legislative
design. Such interpretation would depart from the familiar faithfulagent model though it need not be countermajoritarian as long as the
judges’ interpretive departures follow or advance the public’s views.
According to another (and probably more controversial) form of divergence, elected judges’ greater political accountability might also
justify them in going beyond or against not just the legislature but also the people themselves in ways we would find democratically problematic for entrenched federal judges, who cannot be removed from
office except through the extraordinary and supermajoritarian procedure of impeachment.84 Some of the arguments presented below
support multiple versions of divergence, though others only support
certain types.
The case for interpretive divergence grows stronger as the distinctions between judges increase. Therefore, to see if the argument
for divergence works, we will generally take “unelected judges” to
mean life-tenured judges on the federal model and “elected judges”
to mean judges subject to frequent, competitive partisan elections.
As we have already explained, the reality is more complex and presents a range of institutional forms rather than just two polar opposites. Nonetheless, if the case for divergence can successfully explain
why the judges at the two ends of the spectrum should interpret statutes differently, the analysis may also be useful in figuring out what
to do about the intermediate cases between them.
A. Theoretical Justifications for Interpretive Divergence
The argument for interpretive divergence builds on the fundamental insight that interpretation is an institution-specific activity.
As Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule put it in an influential article: “The central question is not ‘how, in principle, should a
text be interpreted?’ The question instead is ‘how should certain institutions, with their distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret
certain texts?’” 85 The legal philosopher Scott Shapiro likewise contends that the interpretation of legal texts should be “actor-relative.”86
84 See US Const Art I, § 3, cl 6 (“[N]o Person shall be convicted [in impeachment proceedings] without the Concurrence of two thirds of the [Senators] present.”).
85 Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich L
Rev 885, 886 (2003).
86 Scott J. Shapiro, Legality 358–59 (Harvard 2011) (emphasis omitted). Shapiro does not
discuss judicial elections, though he does state more generally that mechanisms of accountability
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Proper interpretive method, in other words, depends on contingent
features of the institutional context. Understood broadly, the relevant institutional context includes both the competencies of interpreters themselves as well as the interpreters’ relationships with other parts of the government.
This insight has been rather widely accepted when it comes to
the possibility of interpretive heterogeneity between wholly separate
governmental institutions, such as the judiciary and administrative
agencies.87 Our task is to show that methodological divergence makes
sense even within the judiciary and in particular that judicial elections should generate that divergence.88 But because unified interpretation is widely embraced (if often only implicitly), it makes sense to
begin the argument by confronting one of the central considerations
supporting uniformity, namely the idea that the essential nature of
judicial power is invariant with respect to methods of judicial selection. If one is instead willing to recognize that judicial power is not so
monolithic after all, that judicial roles vary considerably across systems, then one should be more receptive to the notion of electorally
driven divergences in interpretive methodologies within the judiciary.
1. The “judicial power” is not monolithic.
Much of the argument for unified interpretation boils down to
the view that all judges are judges and that all of them—however
they ascend to the bench—exercise the same judicial power. The
basic problem with this line of thinking is that it risks essentializing
the judicial role and treating the federal judiciary as the model for all
judging. In truth, there is no single essence of judicial power that exists invariant across jurisdictions. After all, one of the basic rules of
textual interpretation is that it is a holistic endeavor, one that looks
to the entirety of the instrument being interpreted.89 Therefore, in
trying to understand what a particular constitution means by “judicial power,” one cannot overlook the fact that the same constitution
might also provide for the popular election of judges. Further, beyond
are relevant in considering how much interpretive discretion is appropriate. Id at 360. Nonetheless, we suspect that he would countenance, at most, a small range in which electorally driven divergence could operate. We reach that conclusion in light of his overall suspicion toward
ambitious or highly discretionary judicial interpretive approaches, which he thinks require
more consensus and trust than a system such as ours can support. Id at 329–30, 371–83.
87 See Part II.A.6.
88 This is not to say that electoral status is the only important institutional difference
among courts. Other factors can drive divergence as well. See note 16 and accompanying text.
89 United Savings Association of Texas v Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd, 484
US 365, 371 (1988).
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differences in how the judicial power itself is constituted, systems can
also differ in terms of their openness to direct democracy, the availability of channels of interbranch communication, levels of legislative
professionalism, and other contextual factors that might shape the
proper understanding of the judicial role.
What are sometimes regarded as universal truths about the nature of the judicial role are, in fact, not so widespread once one looks
outside the federal judiciary. Discussion of the nature and limits of
federal judicial power is colored by a preoccupation with judicial restraint, which in turn derives in large part from the lack of electoral
accountability of the federal judiciary.90 That justification for restraint
is less apt when it comes to most state judiciaries, which are embedded in systems with their own quite different traditions, institutional
contexts, and opportunities for comeuppance. This means, as others
have observed, that state courts may properly employ looser justiciability doctrines than their federal counterparts.91 And state courts do
just that, hearing various kinds of cases that a federal court would
have to dismiss for want of standing, such as those involving abstract
grievances.92
Indeed, variability and contingency penetrate to the core of the
meaning of judicial power. Article III of the US Constitution vests
the federal courts with judicial power only over “cases and controversies,” which restricts federal courts from issuing advisory opinions.93 And even without Article III’s cases and controversies language, one might think that the resolution of discrete disputes is
indeed a defining incident of all properly judicial activity. Yet, despite
all this, some state constitutions permit their courts—wielders of judicial power—to render advisory opinions.94
Another pertinent difference between the state and federal judiciaries concerns the greater importance of the common law in the

90 See, for example, Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 542 US 1, 11 (2004)
(“The standing requirement is born partly of an idea . . . about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”) (quotation marks omitted); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv L Rev 40, 51 (1961).
91 See, for example, Hershkoff, 114 Harv L Rev at 1882–98 (cited in note 7); Linde, 46
Wm & Mary L Rev at 1281–87 (cited in note 7).
92 See, for example, ASARCO Inc v Kadish, 490 US 605, 617 (1989) (“But the state judiciary here chose a different path, as was their right, and took no account of federal standing
rules.”).
93 See Muskrat v United States, 219 US 346, 356–63 (1911). See also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Federal Jurisdiction 57 (Aspen 5th ed 2007).
94 See Hershkoff, 114 Harv L Rev at 1844–52 (cited in note 7).
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state judiciaries. Although there still is some federal common law,95
and although federal courts do fashion state common law in diversity
suits (albeit somewhat reluctantly at times96), the far greater part of
the job of the federal judge concerns the interpretation of statutes
and administrative materials.97 State judges also live in an age of legislation, of course, but the role of enacted text looms less large in
state law. State judges still oversee large bodies of common law,
elaborating it through reasoning that is, by its nature, dynamic and
pragmatic.98 State courts’ common law role, plus their involvement in
various administrative activities beyond the resolution of concrete disputes,99 reinforces their differentiation from their federal counterparts.
None of this is to say that judicial power has no meaning. But it
is to say that judicial power need not mean exactly the same thing in
every jurisdiction. And if that is so, we should also take seriously the
possibility that the institution of judicial elections in particular could
justify heterogeneity in judicial roles, a topic to which we now turn.
2. Making sense of the people’s decision to elect their judges.
One virtue of interpretive divergence is that it can help us make
sense of the fact that judicial elections exist in the first place. In the
late eighteenth century, state judges were typically appointed by legislatures or governors and held office for stated terms or during
“good behavior,” subject to removal; they did not face the voters.100
When states began to establish judicial elections, it was no random
mutation. One might suppose that the chief reason for implementing

95 The Erie doctrine abolished the general federal common law (that is, a nationwide,
judge-made law of subjects like contract and tort), but there remain pockets of federal common law in areas of special federal concern. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of
the New Federal Common Law, 39 NYU L Rev 383, 384, 405–21 (1964).
96 See, for example, Insolia v Philip Morris Inc, 216 F3d 596, 607 (7th Cir 2000) (“Federal
courts are loathe to fiddle around with state law.”).
97 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 12–14 (cited in note 3).
98 See id at 13–14. See also Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century:
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 NYU L Rev 1, 19–29 (1995) (emphasizing the predominance of common law reasoning in state courts even when statutes are at
issue); Pojanowski, 91 Tex L Rev at *15–20 (cited in note 16) (exploring the interaction between common law authority and statutory interpretation).
99 See Williams, American State Constitutions at 298–300 (cited in note 8) (explaining
that “state judicial branches are quite different from the federal judiciary” and are “often
deeply involved in the state’s ongoing policy-making processes”).
100 See Scott Douglas Gerber, A Distinct Judicial Power: The Origins of an Independent
Judiciary 1606–1787 326–29 (Oxford 2011); Evan Haynes, The Selection and Tenure of Judges
101–35 (National Conference of Judicial Councils 1944). Removal was not always limited to
impeachment for misconduct. See Gerber, A Distinct Judicial Power at 89, 114, 141, 327–29
(cited in note 100) (describing the mechanism of removal by “address” of the legislature).
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elections was a desire to clip judges’ wings, to reduce judicial power
by bringing judges under the people’s control. Yet, as Professor Jed
Shugerman shows in recent work, the more prominent motivation
behind the rapid implementation of judicial elections in the middle
of the nineteenth century was instead to empower judges as agents of
the people against corrupt, irresponsible, and overreaching legislators and governors.101 That is, the idea was to turn judges away from
being the political branches’ agents and instead yoke them to the
people.102 Professor Caleb Nelson’s earlier account differs somewhat
in that he sees the rise of judicial elections as part of a broader move
to limit all forms of official power, but he agrees that a key element
of the plan was to set the judges against the legislators, who could
not be trusted to serve the people’s interests.103 Depending on how
exactly one construes the intent behind the creation of elected judiciaries, that intent would seem to support forms of divergence that
grant elected judges greater independence from the legislature or require greater consideration of popular views (or both). This historical
narrative would not appear to support forms of divergence in which
elected judges’ accountability at the polls was intended to give them
more freedom to depart from the people too (though other factors
we discuss might support such a version of divergence104).
Of course, the history of judicial selection did not stop 150 years
ago. State constitutional provisions governing judicial selection have
continued to evolve. Notably, in 1940, Missouri instituted a system of
merit-based selection with periodic retention elections, a system that
many states then embraced for at least some of their judges.105 One
might say that such a system differs from normal elections in that,
while retaining an electoral check, it is more elitist and less populist
in orientation. And yet while the merit plan loosens the bond to the
people, it maintains distance from the other branches, too; the judges

101 Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and
Judicial Review, 123 Harv L Rev 1061, 1065–69, 1097 (2010). As Shugerman acknowledges,
there were some earlier efforts to implement elections for court-curbing reasons, but these did
not take off and spread like the later, differently inspired efforts. Id at 1071–73.
102 See id at 1067, 1097; Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial
Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 Georgetown L J 1349, 1396–97 (2010).
103 Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of the Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am J Legal Hist 190, 207, 217–19 (1993).
104 As noted already, there are a few different forms that divergence might take, and
some of the factors that support divergence support some versions more than others. See introduction to Part II.
105 See Charles H. Sheldon and Linda S. Maule, Choosing Justice: The Recruitment of
State and Federal Judges 6–8, 125–28 (Washington State 1997).
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are just more independent from any external control, moving them
closer to the federal model.
The differences among electoral systems are significant, but the
more important point here for establishing the viability of interpretive divergence is that changes to methods of judicial selection need
to be understood as reforms—that is, as mechanisms that were meant
to alter a defective status quo. To then say that all judges should
nonetheless behave the same way—implicitly, the federal way—
seems quite curious, especially for those states that have devised electoral systems that least resemble the federal model. If a state subjects
its judges to partisan elections every four years, that is probably because it does not want its judges to be like federal judges. If it did, it
could have emulated the federal model, as a few states basically do.106
Even if one is sympathetic to the view that judicial elections
should have some effect on judges’ orientations toward their proper
role, one could still deny that elections hold much relevance to statutory interpretation in particular. Therefore, we next consider how
judicial elections might interact with the leading model of the judicial
role in statutory interpretation, namely the faithful-agent account.
As we show, that model’s logic seems capable of being made sensitive to the manner in which the judge is selected.
3. Judicial elections upset the logic of the faithful-agent
account.
As we explored above, the conventional view of the judicial role
in statutory interpretation casts judges as “faithful agents,” and the
principal to whom the judges owe their fidelity is the legislature.107
The attraction of this view is powerful enough that even those who
defend a significant role for judicial initiative and creativity often argue that their approach can be justified by (some form of) faithfulagent theory. That is, they will emphasize that the legislature issues
only very general and infrequent commands that require significant
creative elaboration, that the legislature’s “meta-intent” authorizes
dynamism, and that current legislative preferences matter too.108 We
will set aside those looser versions of agency theory for the moment

106 A handful of states appoint judges and then let them remain in office without further
political accountability until they reach a mandatory retirement age; one state (Rhode Island)
lets them remain in office for life. See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the
States at *9 (cited in note 13).
107 See note 53 and accompanying text.
108 See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr, Spinning Legislative History, 78 Georgetown
L J 319, 324–26, 343 (1989).
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and focus on the more formalist versions of faithful agency that emphasize judicial subordination and minimize judicial creativity.109
The phenomenon of judicial elections poses quite a puzzle for
the faithful-agent account. After all, the agency theorist demands judicial deference to the legislature largely on grounds of popular sovereignty and democratic values: the legislators, not the judges, are
the people’s elected policy-making representatives.110 As Professor
Thomas Merrill pithily puts it, “Since when are unelected and life
tenured judges the preferred instrument for achieving legal change in
a society committed to popular sovereignty?”111 Yet, as that quotation lays bare, the democratic case for the faithful-agent theory relies
on a claim—or just an assumption—about the relative democratic
pedigree of courts and legislatures. The faithful-agent approach thus
shares a foundation with the countermajoritarian difficulty in constitutional law: the reason that judicial review presents a difficulty is
that unelected judges can trump the decisions of the people’s elected
representatives.112
The institution of judicial elections undermines the democracybased rationale for the faithful-agent account. Perhaps unelected
judges must defer to the legislature in the name of democracy, but
109 Even so limited, there remains internal disagreement over how faithful agents can best
serve the legislature: by punctiliously parsing the enacted text, by following the legislature’s
intentions or purposes, and so forth. There is nonetheless an underlying unity in that these accounts see legislatures as supreme policy makers and courts as constrained policy implementers. See, for example, id at 324.
110 See, for example, Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
Colum L Rev 527, 533 (1947) (“To go beyond [ascertaining the meaning of the words used by
the legislature] is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature.”);
Merrill, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 1575 (cited in note 22) (“[F]aithful agent interpretation is
necessary in order to preserve the bedrock principle of our constitutional government—
popular sovereignty.”); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the
Interpretive Process: An “Institutional” Perspective, 83 Nw U L Rev 761, 803 (1989)
(“[E]ntrusting to the unrepresentative judiciary the authority to second-guess basic legislative
policy choices in nonconstitutional cases threatens our fundamental theoretical premise of
governmental responsiveness to public will through the electoral process.”); Sunstein, 103 Harv
L Rev at 437 (cited in note 53) (“The agency view starts from the important truth that it would
be improper for judges to construe statutes to mean whatever the judges think best; the lawmaking primacy of the legislature, with its superior democratic pedigree, prohibits such a conception of statutory ‘interpretation.’”). But see David Pozen, Are Judicial Elections Democracy-Enhancing?, in Geyh, ed, What’s Law Got to Do with It? 248, 258–72 (cited in note 39)
(exploring some of the complexities in equating democracy with elections). Here we are simply
describing the ordinary logic of the faithful-agent, restraint-based discourse. To be clear, deference to the legislature is not justified solely by drawing on considerations of democracy and
popular sovereignty. Other factors like institutional competence and rule-of-law values are
involved too, and they are addressed in Parts II.A.5 and II.B.
111 Merrill, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 1588 (cited in note 22).
112 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar
of Politics 16–20 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962).
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elected judges are chosen by and are directly accountable to the
people. Shouldn’t they, therefore, have the right (or even the duty)
to act more directly as the people’s agents—or at least as the joint
agents of the legislature and the people? And if the legislature has
strayed from representing the people, shouldn’t the elected judge
stand in the people’s shoes and enforce the people’s purposes instead
of the erring legislature’s? Isn’t the demand for deference to the legislature misplaced? All of these questions are more easily answered
in the affirmative when judges are elected.
As noted above, there are less formalist versions of agency theory, in which all courts should play more independent, lawmaking
roles. We next consider whether judicial elections affect their internal logic too.
4. Divergence is justified even on accounts that envision an
active role for all judges.
Much of the discussion so far contemplates freeing state judges
from the fetters of the conventional restraint-obsessed discourse of
federal judicial power: if federal judges must be passive because of
how they are selected, then state judges can be more active for the
same reason. But what about those commentators who already reject
formalist interpretive methods or strict forms of the faithful-agent
approach for all judges?113 If one believes that even unelected judges
have a broad mandate to act in the name of the people—as their representatives or fiduciaries114—then one might well agree with the
formalists that the mechanism of elections should not alter the proper method of interpreting statutes.
Nonetheless, the advocate of divergence can adduce some
grounds to believe that judicial elections should matter even to those
who give all judges a broad mandate. First, at the level of theory, judicial elections give the citizenry a greater degree of ex post residual
113 See, for example, Dworkin, Law’s Empire at 313–14 (cited in note 40); William D.
Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S Cal L Rev 541, 579 (1988)
(rejecting a separationist approach in favor of a collaborative one in which “legislation is part
of the common law”). Professor William Eskridge has analogized courts to “relational agents.”
Although this formulation evokes the familiar “faithful agent” paradigm, it is clear that his notion of agency contemplates a greater role for independent judgment and creativity than more
conservative agency approaches. Eskridge, 78 Georgetown L J at 322–27 (cited in note 108).
114 See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr, All about Words: Early Understandings of
the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 Colum L Rev 990, 992 (2001)
(“Article III judges interpreting statutes are both agents carrying out directives laid down by
the legislature and partners in the enterprise of law elaboration, for they (like the legislature)
are ultimately agents of ‘We the People.’”); Leib, Ponet, and Serota, 101 Cal L Rev at *27 (cited in note 23).



01 BRUHL & LEIB ART (DO NOT DELETE)

1246

The University of Chicago Law Review

1/11/2013 8:27 AM

[79:1215

control over their judicial fiduciaries. The presence of this check reduces the public’s vulnerability to judicial malfeasance, and so an
elected judge is arguably justified in having even more flexibility
than an unelected counterpart. When an agent is instead virtually
immune from dismissal or public oversight (as federal judges are),
then she should be especially punctilious about following internal
standards of conduct that prevent any abuse of power.115 Put differently, electoral accountability and interpretive methodology can act
as substitutes, as alternative methods of controlling judicial behavior.116 Thus, even if all judges have interpretive freedom of some sort,
not all judges deserve the same range of interpretive freedom.
Second, and perhaps more important, is a practical point. Even
if all judges theoretically enjoy an equal license to act as creative
partners, different types of judges vary tremendously in their ability
to put that license to effective use. In particular, as we explain in Part
II.B below, elected judges are more institutionally competent to
employ more ambitious interpretive approaches than their unelected
counterparts.
5. Interpretive divergence and rule-of-law values.
As we identified earlier, one of the pillars supporting the case
for unified interpretation is the claim that the rule of law limits the
range of permissible interpretive methods, leaving little room for notable divergences in approaches.117 Various values associated with the
rule of law do indeed impose some constraints. For instance, basic
norms of due process require that the judge be impartial as between
the litigants at hand, and so an elected judge should not favor a
campaign contributor just as any judge should not favor a friend or
political ally.118 In addition, for reasons of predictability and consistency, judges should not generally flout controlling precedents and
clearly applicable texts.119

115 See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L Rev
117, 179 (2006) (explaining that agency law typically assigns more stringent duties to agents
that are subject to less supervision by their principals); Leib, Ponet, and Serota, 101 Cal L Rev
at *9 (cited in note 23) (same).
116 See Tushnet, 61 S Cal L Rev at 1669 (cited in note 8) (making this observation in the
context of constitutional decision making).
117 See Part I.A.2.
118 See Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Co, Inc, 556 US 868, 884 (2009).
119 See Merrill, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 1577 (cited in note 22) (emphasizing rule-oflaw objections to dynamic interpretation); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the
Canons, 99 Nw U L Rev 1389, 1393 (2005) (same).
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But beyond such propositions, the identification of the rule of
law with a particular notion of judicial independence—namely independence from public views and values—suggests that once again the
federal model has been mistaken for the essence of judging.120 Yes, a
judge should do what is legally right rather than what is politically
expedient. But in the hard cases—the kinds of cases in which divergence is a plausible option121—the question is what exactly the law
means, and it is difficult to see why in those hard cases the rule of
law prohibits (say) consulting public views, especially if the alternative source is simply an unaccountable judge’s own preferences (“independent” though she may be). Indeed, popularly infused interpretation—one form that divergence could take—might promote the
rule of law if one considers other aspects of that complex concept. As
Professor Richard Primus has recently argued in the context of constitutional interpretation, treating public consensus as an interpretive
authority promotes values like public respect for, and identification
with, governmental institutions.122 That argument works just as well
for statutory interpretation—better in fact, inasmuch as statutes are
not meant to entrench past decisions of the people against evolution
in the way that constitutions arguably are.123
Although we have generally been envisioning notions of divergence according to which elected judges can, in different ways, behave in less conventionally formalist or “constrained” manners, here
we should also consider an approach to divergence that points in
nearly the opposite direction. Namely, perhaps elected judges should
use more constrained methods than appointed judges in order to
avoid the risk that they will be unduly swayed by electoral pressures.

120 That type of independence from the people would not have been welcomed by those
who instituted judicial elections. See Part II.A.2 (discussing the historic rationale for implementing judicial elections). The public’s views of the judiciary are conflicting and even contradictory, but there is at least some support for the proposition that the contemporary public
does not want its judges to be more independent from the people. See, for example, Gibson,
Judging the Politics of Judging at 292 (cited in note 39).
121 See Part III.A (discussing the range of cases in which divergence could be appropriate).
122 Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 Geo Wash L Rev
1207, 1219–21, 1229 (2010). As Primus explains, following public consensus can simultaneously
risk diminishing other components of the rule of law, so one cannot say whether it is a net plus
or a net minus on an across-the-board basis. Id at 1227–29. The point here is just to show that
using such an input can be an affirmative good, not that it invariably is. See Levin, 2012 U Ill L
Rev at 1119–22 (cited in note 40) (arguing that interpreting the law to accord with contemporary expectations promotes predictability and preserves the moral force of law).
123 Thus, one could support popularly infused statutory interpretation even if one is skeptical of judicial attempts to implement popular constitutionalism. See Pozen, 110 Colum L Rev
at 2079–83, 2113–33 (cited in note 2) (questioning whether “majoritarian review” exercised by
elected judges is a sound way to implement popular constitutionalism).
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Although this interpretive posture may even have some positive
support in a recent set of case studies of statutory interpretation in
the states,124 we are skeptical that aggressive formalism is successful in
constraining judges as a general matter.125 We are also skeptical that
formalism is conducive to sociological legitimacy for voters anyway:126
using formalism will not stop voters from evaluating case outcomes
and their presumptive politics.
6. Institution-specific interpretation and the analogy to
agencies.
As part of the case for interpretive divergence, it is worth considering an analogous context where numerous legisprudential
scholars already recognize an important example of interpretive divergence. Namely, it is generally believed that administrative agencies
may, and indeed should, interpret statutes using methods that differ
from judicial techniques. For example, it is said that agencies can
more properly rely on contentious policy considerations, and they
are thought to be more competent at updating statutes in light of
changed circumstances.127
The Supreme Court itself endorsed court-agency interpretive
divergence in its famous decision in Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,128 which directed federal courts to defer
to agencies when statutes are ambiguous or silent.129 It is worth
124 Professor Gluck suggests that elected judges might be more likely to embrace textualism in order to defend themselves against electorally effective charges of “judicial activism.”
Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1860 (cited in note 20). That seems plausible as a matter of explaining
how judges may choose to present themselves. Yet, we do not believe that forms a good normative basis for them actually to be more textualist than appointed judges.
125 See James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 Vand L Rev 1, 96–108 (2005) (using an empirical study to cast
doubt on claims that interpretive canons favored by textualists can promote predictable and
consistent judicial decision making).
126 See Leib and Serota, 120 Yale L J Online at 53–58 (cited in note 21).
127 See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 212–15 (Harvard 2006) (arguing that agencies’ greater competence
permits them to be more ambitious and dynamic than courts); Michael Herz, Purposivism and
Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 Mich St L Rev 89, 101 (concluding
that agencies should be more purposivist than courts); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and
the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin L Rev 501, 504–24 (2005) (discussing a variety of “constitutional and prudential dimensions” of agency interpretive divergence); Peter Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66
Chi Kent L Rev 321, 321–22, 329–35 (1990) (emphasizing agencies’ better understanding of
legislative history and political context).
128 467 US 837 (1984).
129 Id at 842–44.
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spending a moment to unpack Chevron’s rationale, for it is useful in
considering other types of interpretive divergence as well. The Chevron opinion noted that judges lack expertise in technical and scientific matters such as the pollution-control regulations that were before the Court, which provides one reason to defer to agency
experts.130 Even more than expertise, however, the Court justified
deference by relying on the agency’s accountability to the president
and, indirectly, to the people.131 When Congress has not resolved all
of the policy decisions in the statute, Chevron tells us, then “federal
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”132
Although the Chevron Court was discussing federal courts and
federal agencies, this passage provides the outline for a straightforward case for elected judges to diverge from unelected judges in
statutory interpretation methodology. Regarding the accountability
rationale, which some regard as the most important consideration
supporting the Chevron doctrine,133 the obvious point is that although
federal judges have no electoral constituency, elected state judges do.
To that extent they can rightfully claim some of the same policymaking authority that agencies have but federal judges lack.134 When
it comes to expertise, one’s first reaction might be that state judges
are no more expert than federal judges regarding technical and scientific matters.135 That may be true, but that is not the only kind of
expertise that matters. As we will explain next, state courts may have
their own expert competencies in other domains, such as discerning
contemporary social facts and values. If one accepts court-agency divergence, one should at least be open to the possibility of divergence
within the judiciary, too.
B.

The Argument from Relative Competence

Any sound interpretive theory needs to consider the ability of
judges to carry the theory into execution. The common perception
130

Id at 865.
Id at 865–66.
132 Chevron, 467 US at 866.
133 See, for example, John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum L Rev 612, 626 (1996).
134 To be sure, the analogy is imperfect. Although Chevron emphasized that agencies are
held accountable through the president, one might also find agency policy making acceptable
because the legislature can exercise some control via oversight and funding decisions. Legislatures typically do not exercise that degree of control over courts, and one might find it problematic if they did.
135 See Part III.D (discussing rationales for deference to administrative agencies in state
systems).
131
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(or perhaps just prejudice) is that elected state judges are less able
than their appointed, especially federal, counterparts.136 But surely it
depends on what kinds of competencies are at issue. If we believe,
for example, that judges should decide cases in ways that seek to incorporate the community’s current values,137 it is the federal judges
whose abilities we might reasonably doubt. They need not seek or
win the approval of the people to stay in office. They serve lifetime
terms designed to insulate them from public opinion, and as their
tenure lengthens into decades they may come more and more to reflect fading values and bygone political coalitions.138
This Section explores some special competencies of elected judges,
competencies that open up possibilities for interpretive divergence.
1. Advantage in discerning public opinion.
As compared to their unelected peers, elected judges have both
more incentive and greater ability to make fruitful use of popular
opinion. The brute fact of having to face the voters gives elected
judges a strong motivation to understand how the public will receive
their rulings.139 Moreover, at least on state supreme courts, a significant minority of justices have previously served as elected officials,
which supplies a degree of political savvy and comprehension.140
(Contrast that with the modern US Supreme Court, where only one
Justice appointed in the last forty years, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, had previously held any elected political office.)141 Any

136 Consider Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J L,
Econ, & Org 290, 326–28 (2010) (comparing elected and appointed state judges and casting
doubt on the view that elected judges are inferior).
137 Various approaches say we should. See note 40.
138 See Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va L Rev 1045, 1066–69 (2001) (making this observation in the context of setting forth
a theory of “partisan entrenchment”). See also Dennis v United States, 341 US 494, 525 (1951)
(Frankfurter concurring) (“[Courts] are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. . . . Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence.”).
139 See Devins, 62 Stan L Rev at 1659–68 (cited in note 37) (describing state judges’ incentives to take political consequences into account in the context of constitutional decision making).
140 See Chris W. Bonneau, The Composition of State Supreme Courts 2000, 85 Judicature
26, 28 table 1 (2001) (providing data on prior political experience of state supreme court justices as of 1994 and 2000); Henry R. Glick and Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial
Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 Judicature 228, 232 table 1
(1987) (providing similar data for 1980–1981).
141 See Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior
67 (Princeton 2006) (stating that only 7.7 percent of Supreme Court Justices appointed from
1969–2005 had previously run for an elected political office, compared with 38.1 percent of Justices appointed from 1933–1968, 57.9 percent of Justices appointed from 1896–1932, and 86.4
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elected judge that has remained on the bench has demonstrated
some facility in gauging the most important public reactions (at least
where elections are genuine events, a notable caveat). Note that the
argument here does not rely on the judicial elections themselves offering particularized guidance for decision making; the judges can
draw on other election results, their reading of the community’s general sensibilities, and so forth.
To be sure, one has to assess competence in a cross-institutional
way. Even if elected judges are quite good at discerning public opinion—both in absolute terms and as compared to unelected judges—
one might suppose that the real question is whether elected judges
are more adept than the legislature, which writes the laws. Despite
their dependence on the voters, elected judges are more insulated
from the public than are legislators. In addition, legislators act
through institutions—their legislative committees, their party caucuses, and the legislature as a whole—that can accumulate and process information, including information about public opinion, in
ways a judge (or even a small group of judges) cannot.142 If legislatures are superior gauges of popular opinion, then the populist might
well conclude on comparative institutional grounds that even elected
courts should treat the legislature’s products—the statutes themselves as well as reliable legislative history like committee reports—
as the best proxies for popular preferences rather than try to divine
the public’s sentiments for themselves.
There is some force to this point, but it is not decisive. It is well
understood that legislative preferences can, for various reasons, diverge from popular opinion.143 For instance, although a recent statute
might accurately reflect contemporary opinions, the powerful forces
of legislative inertia and vetogates mean that statutes are usually old
and, often, out of step with current societal facts and values. That
legislative sluggishness is, after all, the reason many people are
drawn to dynamic interpretation and allied approaches that urge
percent of Justices appointed from 1861–1895); Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of
Supreme Court Justice Pre-appointment Experience, 64 Fla L Rev 1137, 1154–55 (2012).
142 See Pozen, 110 Colum L Rev at 2116 (cited in note 2) (“Even when its members are
elected at regular intervals, a court will never be as broadly accessible as the legislature, nor
will it possess the latter’s deliberative structures, information gathering resources, or proactive
lawmaking capabilities.”). To be clear, Pozen then goes on to describe circumstances in which
the legislature’s competency advantage might be eroded. Id at 2117–18.
143 Indeed, one of the more common ways of attempting to dissolve the countermajoritarian difficulty is by showing that legislatures are not so majoritarian either. See Mark A.
Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order,
4 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 361, 372–80 (2008) (reviewing recent literature emphasizing the countermajoritarian aspects of the political branches).
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judges to update aging enactments.144 So even if recently enacted
statutes, when present, might be the best available gauge of public
sentiment, a judge recently chosen in a salient election might beat a
moldering statute.
Although we believe that the argument from relative competence is one of the most forceful points in the case for interpretive
divergence, one has to acknowledge some weaknesses in the argument. Even if public opinion can be a useful input in judicial decision
making, and even if elected judges are well positioned to understand
it, judicial elections may be poor mechanisms for conveying it. Elections are always crude means of communication, and some judicial
elections are particularly opaque due to low levels of interest, information, and participation.145 Further, even setting aside the prospect
of the election itself conveying particularized information—which is
perhaps too ambitious—elections will not even generate incentives for
judges to attend to public views if the elections are mere charades.
Without denying the real limitations of judicial elections, one
should keep in mind that times change and that the frequent claim
that judicial elections are meaningless affairs may reflect an outdated
understanding of the reality of elections today.146 Moreover, here we
need to recall the differences between different types of judicial
elections, for partisan elections tend to perform quite well qua elections. For example, partisan elections for state supreme court seats
are actually more competitive (in terms of the rates at which incumbents are challenged and lose) than elections for the US House of
Representatives and Senate.147 Similarly, the high rates of ballot
rolloff that are often cited to show that voters do not attend to judicial elections are largely a phenomenon of retention elections and
nonpartisan elections; rolloff rates in partisan elections are quite

144 See, for example, Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 123–25 (cited in note
40). See also Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 31–43 (Harvard 1982)
(describing attempts to use interpretation to counteract legislative inertia but ultimately deeming them inadequate to the problem).
145 See Part I.B.
146 See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 Colum L Rev 265, 267–68,
296–300 (2008) (describing the “new era” in which judicial elections are more like other elections). See also Streb, How Judicial Elections Are Like Other Elections at 195–200 (cited in
note 75) (summarizing research on the competitiveness of judicial elections and stating that
“the traditional view that judicial elections . . . are mostly sleepy affairs has been debunked,” at
least for state supreme courts).
147 See Bonneau and Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections at 78–89 table 4.5 (cited in note
18). Judicial elections are sometimes more competitive than gubernatorial elections and sometimes less competitive, depending on the year. See id at 85–86 table 4.5.
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low.148 These complexities highlight the fact that whether elected
judges should diverge depends on the actual electoral circumstances.
2. Advantage in understanding the legislature.
In some versions of interpretive divergence, elected judges could
properly view themselves as more independent from the legislature
than could their unelected peers. Nonetheless, statutory interpretation is an interbranch affair, and so even judges that do not regard
themselves as the legislature’s servants still benefit from understanding the legislature and its preferences. Here too elected judges have
an advantage. As a matter of character, elected judges are political
creatures who must, like state legislators but unlike federal judges,
periodically face the voters in order to remain in office.149 Indeed, it is
not uncommon for state supreme court justices to have previously
served as legislators or other elected officials.150 Moreover, regardless
of methods of judicial selection, the relationships between legislators
and high court judges in a state capital are often close, quite different
from the near estrangement of the federal judicial and legislative
branches.151
The elected judge can put her understanding of the legislature to
good use in a number of ways. For one thing, theorists as diverse as
Professors William Eskridge Jr and Einer Elhauge have both argued
that judges should interpret statutes consistently with the preferences

148

See id at 22–28.
In a handful of states, judges are dependent on the legislature for their continuance in
office, either because the legislature itself is the reappointing authority or because it must approve the governor’s reappointment. See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the
States at *3–11 (cited in note 13). Such judges have strong incentives to understand the legislature and its preferences for the same reason popularly elected judges need to understand the
public. The argument in the text is that even popularly elected judges will understand the legislature better than will federal judges.
150 See Bonneau, 85 Judicature at 28 table 1 (cited in note 140) (providing the career history for state judges); Glick and Emmert, 70 Judicature at 232–33 & table 1 (cited in note 140).
See also Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in Robert A. Katzmann, ed,
Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity 117, 118 (Brookings 1988) (“[M]any state
judges, by dint of prior political experience as legislators or prosecutors, are quite familiar with
the legislative branch and feel comfortable interacting with it.”).
151 See Williams, American State Constitutions at 299 (cited in note 8) (explaining that
state judges have “more regular involvement in the workings of other branches” and “are often
deeply involved in the state’s ongoing policy-making processes”); Linde, Observations of a
State Court Judge at 118 (cited in note 150) (noting that “[a]s elected representatives, like legislators, [state judges] feel less hesitant to offer their policy views than do appointed judges” and
that state judges find it “relatively easy . . . to stay in touch with legislative activities”).
149
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of the current legislature, not just the enacting legislature.152 Although their work tends to emphasize the federal courts and the US
Supreme Court in particular, it is actually elected state judges who
are best positioned to use current legislative preferences as interpretive inputs. Elected judges might put their understanding of the legislature to use in more oppositional ways too, such as by diagnosing
and responding to corruption and pathology in the legislative process.153 More generally, any theory that envisions some sort of dialogue or dynamic interaction between courts and legislatures—
whether cooperative or confrontational—requires as a factual predicate that the judiciary speak the legislature’s language. That kind of
fluency is more likely to be found in state judiciaries, especially
where they are elected.
***
We have now presented what strikes us as the strongest case
for the proposition that elected judges and unelected judges should
diverge in their interpretive methods. That proposition is supported
by the need to make sense of the existence of judicial elections, the
internal logic of leading accounts of statutory interpretation, and the
relative competence of elected judges in responding to public opinion and interacting with the legislature. Moreover, divergence is not
necessarily prohibited by the separation of powers or the rule of law.
Of course, in Part I we constructed a case for the contrary position, namely that all judges should approach statutory interpretation
the same way, regardless of their mode of selection. Where, then,
does this leave us? The next Part attempts to answer that question by
developing some implications of the analysis and reaching some tentative conclusions regarding when and how elections should influence interpretive method.
III. SYNTHESIS AND APPLICATIONS: WHEN AND HOW SHOULD
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS MATTER?
As the discussion so far shows, the question whether elections
should affect interpretive method implicates deeply contentious issues concerning the nature of statutory interpretation and the proper
152 William N. Eskridge Jr, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 Yale L J 331, 391, 404–05 (1991); Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret
Unclear Legislation 9–10, 41–69 (Harvard 2008).
153 To the extent that the legislative dysfunction is due to interest-group capture, the judiciary will not solve the problem if it is captured, too. This is a real risk that accompanies judicial elections, a point to which we will return. See Part III.B.2.
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role of courts in a democracy. Perhaps some readers are prepared to
declare a winner, having confirmed an initial preconception and put
it upon a more solid foundation or, upon reflection, having changed
their prior views. For our part, we find that this continues to be a
tough question, and we think it would be foolhardy to expect to settle the matter definitively in this first systematic foray into the subject. Nonetheless, having presented the best cases for the two contending positions, there are some lessons we can draw from this
investigation at both the level of high theory and the level of specific
doctrines.
This Part begins by surveying, in Part III.A, the extent of the
territory in which judicial selection could plausibly influence interpretation. Even someone who is quite persuaded of the importance
of elections will recognize that other considerations will and should
drive the results in many cases, indeed probably in most cases. Interpretive divergence—even under the most favorable conditions for
it—is thus more of the exception than the rule. Having narrowed
down the field, we then present, in Part III.B, examples of situations
in which the case for divergence—of one form or another—is at its
strongest. Finally, in Parts III.C and III.D respectively, we address
two interesting applications of the analysis: the problem of crosssystem interpretation (for example, elected state judges interpreting
federal law, and vice versa) and the doctrine of state court deference
to state administrative agencies.
A. The (Limited) Range in Which Elections Should Matter
Judicial elections should not matter in every case. Indeed, they
probably should not matter in most cases. This is so for several reasons.
If popular views should play a more prominent role as an interpretive input for elected judges (and remember that this is just one
form that divergence might take), then that source will often be neutral in the sense that the people will not have even a hypothetical (let
alone actual) view about the matter before the court. If divergence
instead means that elected judges enjoy a larger zone of discretionary freedom to depart from popular preferences, then the electorate’s lack of particularized preferences is not a problem. Nonetheless, if elected judges have such freedom, few cases will provoke
them to feel moved to use it. After all, many interpretive questions
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are quite technical and unlikely to arouse much passion in anyone,
whether the people, the legislators, or the judges themselves.154
Moreover, even in those cases that hold the potential to generate strong views, often the enacted text and other traditional tools of
statutory construction will yield only one plausible answer. People
may disagree over whether any particular case falls into the category
of the clear case and about what the “traditional tools of statutory
construction” actually are,155 but there is no real doubt that some easy
cases exist and that within many jurisdictions there is plenty of
agreement about what tools may be used to interpret the words of a
statute. Elections provide no escape from easy cases. After all, governors and presidents are elected and have a genuine democratic
pedigree,156 but they still have to follow the law in the easy cases.
Elected judges are no different.
Judicial precedent might also narrow down the range in which
elections should matter. An interpretive problem that might have
started out in the zone of reasonable disagreement can become more
closed—easier—once a prior court decision has chosen one meaning
over another. Predictability and allied rule-of-law values would seem
to require that the prior interpretation remain in force even if an
election has since turned the prior judges out of office, especially
where private reliance is substantial. In line with that intuition, the
US Supreme Court and several other courts have stated that old
precedents should remain valid despite the later adoption of an interpretive method that would have resolved the prior case differently.157 The Court’s rationale drew on the familiar rule-of-law case for
stare decisis: to overrule would “substitute disruption, confusion, and

154 In that regard, consider this appraisal of the Supreme Court’s October Term 1989
statutory interpretation cases:

None of them was interesting. Not one. Compared to flag burning or affirmative action or separation of powers or political patronage, these cases struck me as real
dogs. That is not to say they were socially unimportant. Far more of the public welfare of the United States turns on questions of qualification for AFDC benefits than
on the question of flag desecration.
Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning,
1990 S Ct Rev 231, 247.
155 Chevron, 467 US at 843 n 9.
156 A chief executive arguably has a better democratic pedigree than any particular legislator in that she is elected by the whole people instead of just a subset. Of course, at the federal
level, the president has only an indirect and contingent democratic pedigree, thanks to the
Electoral College.
157 See Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1822–24 (cited in note 20). Not every court agrees: the
Michigan Supreme Court, notably, overruled dozens of precedents in the years after a newly
formed majority adopted a textualist approach. See id at 1803–04, 1824.
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uncertainty for necessary legal stability.”158 Indeed, statutory precedents are said to enjoy an especially entrenched status.159
And yet perhaps one should not be so quick to exclude the possibility of overruling precedent on account of an intervening election.
Although inferior courts are strictly required to follow their superior
courts’ precedents, a court does not have an absolute duty to follow
its own precedents.160 Overruling is permissible in special circumstances, even in statutory cases.161 In determining what makes for
special circumstances, shouldn’t it matter that the voters threw the
prior judges out of office because those judges’ particular decisions,
or general interpretive strategies, were, by the people’s lights,
wrong? Part of the justification for heightened stare decisis in statutory cases is that separation-of-powers principles put the legislature
in charge of making and changing policy,162 but that rationale is less
forceful in elected judiciaries. When it comes to other elected offices,
people believe elections should have consequences, including reversals of policy. To be sure, the judicial office is somewhat different:
unlike most other changes in law, judicial overrulings are ordinarily
retroactive and thus hold the potential for greater unfairness where
there has been reliance.163 And although it is possible that judicial
elections could engage with disputes over interpretive approaches in
a meaningful way,164 we should guard against reading too much significance into electoral results. Nonetheless, with those important qualifications, it seems to us that the domain of cases in which elections
could matter includes those in which there are precedents on point.
Stare decisis applies even in elected judiciaries, but it need not apply
in just the same way and with exactly the same force.165

158 John R. Sand & Gravel Co v United States, 552 US 130, 139 (2008). See also CBOCS
West, Inc v Humphries, 553 US 442, 457 (2008) (“Principles of stare decisis . . . demand respect
for precedent whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same.”).
159 See Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 172–73 (1989).
160 See Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command.”).
161 See, for example, Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 485 US 617, 618–19 (1988) (per
curiam) (citing cases in which statutory precedents were overruled).
162 See Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich L Rev 177, 200–15 (1989).
163 See James B. Beam Distilling Co v Georgia, 501 US 529, 534–38 (1991) (Souter); Bouie
v City of Columbia, 378 US 347, 350–54 (1964).
164 See Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1803–11 (cited in note 20).
165 As an empirical matter, it appears that precedent does in fact have less force in states
with elected judiciaries, especially those with partisan elections. See Stefanie A. Lindquist,
Stare Decisis as Reciprocity Norm, in Geyh, ed, What’s Law Got to Do with It? 173, 184–85
(cited in note 39).



01 BRUHL & LEIB ART (DO NOT DELETE)

1258

B.

1/11/2013 8:27 AM

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:1215

Scenarios in Which Judicial Elections Plausibly Matter

Having gone some way toward limiting the domain in which
elections could matter, let us now consider the kinds of cases in
which the argument for interpretive divergence is at its strongest.
That is, we are looking for situations in which it is most likely that
one’s verdict on the propriety of a court’s interpretation would
change based on how the judges were selected. More modestly, the
aim is to identify situations in which, even if one’s final verdict on the
correctness of the decision remains the same, one’s level of confidence
in that verdict varies according to how the judges were selected.
As we have already emphasized, interpretive divergence might
take multiple forms, which could act as complements or even alternatives. Thus we will consider a few different scenarios below. Nonetheless, to make a generalization, the circumstances in which divergence is most compelling tend to be cases that implicate independent
judicial policy making and the countermajoritarian- and competencebased anxieties that swirl around it. If criticisms of independentminded judicial interpretation have less bite in the context of elected
judiciaries, that would be a real advance and would provide some
justification for interpretive divergence between elected and appointed judges.
1. Updating in light of changed social circumstances.
Many different legisprudential theorists argue that statutory interpretation need not limit itself to an archeological search for a
statute’s original meaning. Rather, the meaning can change, even
without legislative amendment, as the surrounding social and legal
circumstances change. That is, interpretation can be dynamic.166 And
interpretation might need to be dynamic if statutes are to remain
workable, for legislatures suffer from inertia, procedural hurdles, and
limited agendas, all of which tend to impair their ability to update
statutes as circumstances change. One can object to judicial use of
dynamic methods on a number of grounds, of course.167 Here we do
166 For two of the works most closely associated with this idea, see Eskridge, Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation (cited in note 40); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich L Rev 20 (1988).
167 See, for example, Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty at 105–15 (cited in note 127)
(raising competence objections); Merrill, 14 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 1575–79, 1588–89 (cited in
note 22) (raising democratic and rule-of-law objections); Martin H. Redish and Theodore T.
Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in
Statutory Interpretation, 68 Tulane L Rev 803, 805–07, 833, 840–58 (1994) (raising democratic
and competence objections); Tyler, 99 Nw U L Rev at 1393 (cited in note 119) (raising stability
and predictability objections).
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not wade into that debate, with all its arguments and counterarguments, except to point out that the balance of arguments weighs
somewhat differently—and more strongly in favor of judicial dynamism—when the dynamic interpreter is elected. This is so for two
primary reasons.
First, one enduring objection to judicial updating of statutes is
that it is undemocratic. It is said to be undemocratic because it envisions policy making by unelected judges. As Professor Martin Redish
and Theodore Chung put it, “dynamic interpretation [is] a transparent and constitutionally suspect transfer of lawmaking power from a
popularly elected Congress to an unaccountable judiciary.”168 That
particular line of argument loses much of its sting when the judges
are elected too, at least where judicial elections involve genuine
accountability.
Second, judicial elections also diminish objections based on judicial competence. Depending on the version of dynamic interpretation at issue, judges might be encouraged to update statutes by looking to current (rather than enacting) legislative preferences or
current social values.169 One could wonder whether a judge would be
any good at discerning either, when the judge never faces the voters,
has no political experience, and has little interaction with the legislature. The institutional and personal circumstances of elected judges,
by contrast, give them an advantage in understanding the changing
wishes of the people and the legislature.170
2. Trumping the legislature in the name of the people.
The previous Subsection involved the scenario in which the
courts go somewhat beyond enacted policies but with the ultimate
aim of helping the legislature overcome inertia and better represent
the people. One can also imagine situations in which the courts
should perhaps act more antagonistically toward the legislature, such
as when the legislature appears to be advancing special interests at
the expense of the common good. An example might be Mississippi
Poultry Association, Inc v Madigan,171 in which the Fifth Circuit was
168 Redish and Chung, 68 Tulane L Rev at 833 (cited in note 167) (emphasis added). Redish and Chung repeatedly link their democratic critique of judicial dynamism to the judiciary’s lack of electoral accountability. See id at 807, 811, 851, 877. See also notes 110–11 and
accompanying text.
169 See note 40 (discussing judicial interpretive theories that account for current public
views); note 152 (discussing judicial interpretive theories that account for current legislative
preferences).
170 See Part II.B (discussing elected judges and their connection with the electorate).
171 31 F3d 293 (5th Cir 1994) (en banc).
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faced with a federal statute requiring imported poultry products to
be inspected under “the same” standards as domestic poultry.172 The
Department of Agriculture had promulgated a regulation that interpreted the statute to require inspection rules “at least equal to” domestic standards.173 The Mississippi Poultry Association challenged
the agency’s regulation on the ground that the statute required identical inspection regimes, a position the agency considered absurd because it would bar the importation of foreign poultry inspected under superior safety standards.174
Of course, that bar on imports would not be absurd if one
thought the legislative purposes of the statute were not public health
and safety but instead protection of the domestic poultry industry—
even at the cost of making consumers pay more for less sanitary
chicken. That is, a standard mandating identical inspections would be
perfectly sensible if one imagined that Congress was behaving as
public choice theory would predict, namely by responding to the
lobbying efforts of a concentrated interest with a lot of money on the
line rather than promoting the diffuse interests of the public at
large.175 Some judges on the court were content to view the statute as
reflecting such pathologies and were unwilling to interpret the statute to avoid that outcome:
Had the Agency labeled the actions of Congress protectionism,
we would not necessarily disagree. But, while that may be
deemed in some quarters to be unwise or undesirable, it cannot
be labeled “absurd” in the context of divining the result intended by Congress. The Agency’s complaint, therefore, is one implicating the clear policy choice of Congress—a choice made,
undoubtedly, in response to effective lobbying by domestic
poultry producers. It is not within the purview of the Agency,
however—or of the courts for that matter—to alter, frustrate, or
subvert congressional policy.176

172 Id at 297. The case was initially heard before a three-judge panel, which reached the
same result as the en banc court. See Mississippi Poultry Association, Inc v Madigan, 992 F2d
1359, 1364–65 (5th Cir 1993).
173 Mississippi Poultry Association, 31 F3d at 297.
174 Id at 308.
175 See Michael T. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators: A Theory of Political Markets 40–65
(Rutgers 1981).
176 Mississippi Poultry Association, 992 F2d at 1365 (emphasis omitted). The en banc majority opinion did not dispute that Congress could engage in bad policy like protectionism if it
wishes, but the opinion also offered public-interest justifications for its reading of the statute,
such as the ease of administering a single uniform standard. See Mississippi Poultry Association, 31 F3d at 309–10.
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This is the kind of case in which elections might justify courts
playing a more active role. On the standard account of the judicial
role in statutory interpretation, judges are supposed to be the faithful
agents of the legislature,177 and that is how the (unelected) judges of
the Fifth Circuit present themselves in the passage quoted above.
But what about when the legislature is itself unfaithful to the people?
To be sure, even unelected judges are, ultimately, the people’s agents
and not just the legislature’s lackeys; accordingly, maybe all courts
should act in the name of the people to ameliorate the effects of a
legislative process that is captured by an interest group.178 Yet, for the
unelected judge, the relationship with the people is indirect and mediated by the legislature, which is the people’s elected policy-making
body. Departing from the legislature’s design raises all of the familiar
restraint-based anxieties.
Elected judges, by contrast, are selected by and accountable to
the people directly and so need not be so anxious. Indeed, as we
have seen, judicial elections were often instituted precisely in order
to police the legislature’s loyalty to the people.179 So when the interests of the elected judge’s two masters conflict—and the rent-seeking
scenario provides a paradigm case of that—the elected judge should
have fewer qualms about trumping the legislature in the name of the
people (subject, of course, to rule-of-law limits along the lines discussed above180). Moreover, from the point of view of pragmatic
competence, elected judges on a state supreme court can probably
do a better job than their appointed counterparts of diagnosing when
their legislative colleagues across the street have fallen prey to interest-group pathologies.181
To be sure, there is a practical problem with imagining elected
judiciaries acting to suppress certain types of legislative dysfunction,
177

See note 53 and accompanying text.
Some theorists have in fact argued that judges should try to ameliorate dysfunctions in
the legislative process, for example by interpreting statutes to counteract the legislative influence of rent-seeking special interests. See, for example, Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 151–61 (cited in note 40); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223,
227, 252 (1986).
179 See Part II.A.2.
180 See Part III.A. In the poultry-inspection case, we do not see a strong rule-of-law objection to embracing the “at least as good as” interpretation. The court would be upholding the
agency’s forward-looking regulation rather than imposing retroactive liability, and, in the context of a safety standard, a textual requirement to “follow the same standard” can readily bear
the meaning of “follow standards that are the same or safer.” See Mississippi Poultry Association, 31 F3d at 310–12 (Higginbotham dissenting).
181 See Part II.B.2 (discussing relative competence in understanding and relating to the
legislature).
178
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namely that the very same interest-group pathologies that occasionally sway the legislative process might interfere with judicial elections too. Judicial candidates, like their legislative counterparts, often need to raise money for their campaigns and can be as subject to
contribution-minded decision making as legislators.182 Indeed, it may
be cheaper to buy a court majority than a legislative one. Given that
background, we cannot be overly sanguine about the prospects of
elected judges actually using the legislature-trumping legitimacy that
their democratic pedigree confers. Competitive partisan races, despite their other democratic advantages, may be the worst in terms of
interest-group influence.183 Retention elections and nonpartisan races, notwithstanding their other democratic deficits, might therefore
hold more promise when it comes to counteracting legislative capture. Viewed in their best light, these elections might represent a sort
of happy medium that balances normative and positive concerns:
enough electoral accountability to make counterlegislative action legitimate, enough insulation from monetary pressure to make it realistically possible. Viewed less charitably, the problem of interestgroup capture may show that the plans of those who instituted judicial
elections have gone awry: by pulling judges away from the corrupting
effect of legislative influence, the judges have been driven into corruption themselves and rendered incapable of safeguarding the public interest.
3. Beyond the people?
We have just discussed the situation in which a court engages in
interpretation that is countermajoritarian in the sense that it overrides the legislature’s preferences. Yet a court’s action in such a case
actually promotes the people’s interests, rescuing them from the dereliction of the people’s supposed representatives in the legislature.
This naturally leads to the next question: What about interpretation
that goes beyond or even against the public too? Do elections alleviate concerns about decisions that are too independent from the people themselves?
As before, a concrete scenario can focus our analysis. Consider
the problem, faced by numerous courts interpreting broadly similar
state adoption laws, of whether the same-sex partner of a child’s

182 See text accompanying notes 37–38, 81–82 (discussing the risks of corruption that accompany campaign funding).
183 See Kang and Shepherd, 86 NYU L Rev at 74–76, 106–19 (cited in note 82).
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biological parent can adopt the child as a second parent.184 For purposes of exposition, let us focus initially on what is probably the most
famous case on the issue, the 1995 decision of the New York Court
of Appeals (the state’s highest court) in the case of In the Matter of
Jacob.185 The most pertinent statutory provision stated (as of 1995)
that “[a]n adult unmarried person or an adult husband and his adult
wife together may adopt another person.”186 The lesbian partner in
Jacob was certainly “an adult unmarried person,” so this provision
supported the right to adopt.187 The textual difficulty arises because
the New York adoption statute, like many others, includes another
section providing that an order of adoption terminates the child’s
connection with the birth parent(s),188 which is obviously not what a
couple in this situation intends. There were several express statutory
exceptions to the termination rule, such as in the case of an adoption
by a stepparent who had married the birth parent.189 But the New
York statute and others like it had no such exception to termination
in the case of adoption by an unmarried partner, same sex or otherwise. This suggests that such an adoption was not contemplated by the
text and, arguably, not textually possible as a matter of plain language.
Moving beyond the bare text to consider legislative intent, the
intent would of course vary depending on the particular state at issue
and the age of the relevant portions of the adoption law. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that in many cases the enacting legislators would
not have thought about adoption by a same-sex partner and, if they
had thought about it, their reaction would have been negative. (As
one notable commentary on Jacob puts it, the legislators of yore
would not have stopped with denying the right to adopt but “would
have had the women arrested for violating the state sodomy law.”190)
In New York, the legislature had amended parts of the adoption law
from time to time to reflect modern familial realities—stepparent
184 See Alona R. Croteau, Comment, Voices in the Dark: Second Parent Adoptions When
the Law Is Silent, 50 Loyola L Rev 675, 685–97 (2004) (reviewing developments in various
states). The issue continues to arise. See, for example, S.J.L.S. v T.L.S., 265 SW3d 804, 809–10
(Ky App 2008).
185 660 NE2d 397 (NY 1995). The case actually involved two separate adoption petitions,
the other of which concerned a cohabiting boyfriend’s attempt to adopt the biological child of
his female partner. Id at 398. For purposes of presenting our test case, we are only concerned
with the same-sex couple.
186 NY Dom Rel Law § 110 (McKinney 1991).
187 Jacob, 660 NE2d at 400 n 2.
188 See NY Dom Rel Law § 117(1)(a) (McKinney 1987).
189 See NY Dom Rel Law § 117(1)(d) (McKinney 1987). See also Jacob, 660 NE2d at 411,
414 (Bellacosa dissenting) (citing special provisions that act as exceptions to the general terms
of the adoption law).
190 Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation at 740 (cited in note 5).
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adoptions, adoptions by teen fathers, open adoptions, and so
forth191—but the legislature did not amend the termination provision
to allow the second-parent scenario at issue in Jacob. All of this
tends toward an intent-based argument against the adoption. On the
other side of the ledger, one could argue that permitting the adoption would further the general legislative purpose of promoting the
best interests of the child and would advance sound social policy.192
The various state courts to have confronted this interpretive
problem have struggled with it and have divided on the issue.193 In Jacob itself, a bare majority of the New York high court, in an opinion
by Chief Judge Judith Kaye, read the statute to permit the adoption.194 That courts would struggle with these cases is perhaps unsurprising. Equality for same-sex couples in matters of family relations
like marriage and adoption has been a contentious social issue, and it
is an area where public attitudes are evolving. Statutory text often
lags behind societal changes, providing an opportunity for judicial
updating. Constitutional norms of equal treatment likewise press
judges to modernize stale texts and, perhaps, even to move out in
front of current attitudes. These are, in short, hard cases.
Our concern, of course, is whether judicial selection has any
bearing on how judges ought to resolve these difficult problems.
Then-Governor of New York George Pataki and some state legislative leaders certainly seemed to think that judicial selection mattered. Pataki responded to the Jacob ruling by stating that “[p]olicy
matters such as this . . . should be made by the elected officials of the
people, namely the Legislature and the Governor, and not by an appointed judiciary.”195 Whatever one thinks of Pataki’s normative position, he was right about the judges’ status: the judges of New York’s
high court are appointed to fourteen-year terms by the governor
from a list of candidates generated by a nominating commission, with
reappointment to additional terms pursuant to the same process.196

191

See Jacob, 660 NE2d at 403–04.
The dissent in Jacob disagreed that the result would advance the legislative purpose, arguing that the interest in placing a child in a stable family situation could be threatened when the
adoptive parents’ own relationship was not legally recognized. Id at 406–08 (Bellacosa dissenting).
193 See Croteau, Comment, 50 Loyola L Rev at 685–97 (cited in note 184).
194 Jacob, 660 NE2d at 405–06.
195 James Dao, New York’s Highest Court Rules Unmarried Couples Can Adopt, NY
Times A1 (Nov 3, 1995) (quoting Pataki and reporting that the state senate majority leader
“echoed [Pataki’s] comments”).
196 NY Const Art VI, § 2. See also History of Reform Efforts: New York; Formal Changes
Since Inception (American Judicature Society), online at http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial
_selection/reform_efforts/formal_changes_since_inception.cfm?state=NY (visited Nov 20, 2012).
192
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The rather insulated New York court had moved more quickly toward equality than the state political process was ready to go.
Getting out ahead of the legislature may not be a judicial sin, of
course, especially if the court is representing the people better than
the legislature itself. Indeed, one could mount a majoritarian defense
of Jacob by contending that the New York legislative process was
failing to express public sentiment due to interest-group dynamics,
upstate versus downstate deadlocks, or other pathologies. If so, the
Jacob decision might be considered counterlegislative but not really
countermajoritarian. Structurally, it would resemble the poultryinspection case discussed in the previous Subsection.
But what if a decision permitting a same-sex partner to adopt
would go not just beyond or against the legislature but also beyond
or against the people too? It is hard to know for certain whether
the Jacob decision accorded with New York public opinion,197 but
remember that this issue arose in many other states as well, including
some that are usually regarded as more socially conservative. For instance, consider Indiana, where the state’s intermediate appellate
court permitted second-parent adoptions under factual and legal circumstances similar to those in Jacob.198 While New York has very recently authorized gay marriage, Indiana law forbids it.199 Let us assume, to make the test case perfectly clear, that a decision permitting
a same-sex partner to adopt as a second parent would conflict with
public opinion. Such legislative and popular disapproval is hardly
dispositive, and one could defend the decision on frankly countermajoritarian grounds. Protecting disfavored minorities is, after all, one
of the functions for which we often turn to courts, and one need not
limit that role to constitutional interpretation. At the same time,
197 Adoption by same-sex couples was pretty strongly disfavored by national majorities in
1995. See Karlyn Bowman and Adam Foster, Attitudes about Homosexuality & Gay Marriage
38–40 (American Enterprise Institute June 2, 2008), online at http://www.aei.org/files/2008/06/
03/20080603-Homosexuality.pdf (visited Nov 20, 2012) (compiling data from numerous opinion
polls). In New York, however, by 1995 there was already an administrative regulation (though
not a statute) providing that a potential adoptive parent could not be turned away solely because
of homosexuality. See Jacob, 660 NE2d at 401. Further, one would assume that attitudes toward
second-parent adoptions by the same-sex partner of the child’s biological parent would be more
favorable than opinions on the more general question of adoptions by same-sex couples.
198 See In the Matter of the Adoption of K.S.P., 804 NE2d 1253, 1257 (Ind App 2004).
199 Compare Nicholas Confessore and Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex
Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, NY Times A1 (June 25, 2011), with Ind Code
§ 31-11-1-1. The Indiana legislature recently voted overwhelmingly in favor of a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage or civil unions, though the amendment would
have to be approved by the next legislature and then be approved in a referendum to take effect. See Heather Gillers, Marriage Amendment Clears First of 3 Steps, Indianapolis Star A1
(Mar 30, 2011).
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however, a countermajoritarian defense is vulnerable to all the timehonored, restraint-oriented criticisms.
The basic conflict between minority rights and majority rule may
be insoluble (and it is definitely insoluble within the confines of this
Article), but does the problem at least look different when one considers judicial selection? The judges of the Indiana intermediate appellate court are appointed by the governor from a list provided by a
nominating commission and, after their initial retention election,
serve ten-year terms.200 The judges of the New York high court, recall, do not even face retention elections.201 The adoption decisions
issued by these two courts would be harder to criticize on conventional democratic grounds were the judges rendering them subject to
real elections.
Genuine accountability through elections confers, we believe, a
degree of decisional freedom that unaccountable judges lack. At first
blush this claim might seem surprising, for one might suppose that
elected judges, as agents of the people, should not rule against what
the people want. Yet, upon further reflection, that view is too simplistic. When it comes to legislators, who are even more clearly supposed
to be the people’s representatives, it is not at all clear that a legislator’s duty is to mirror the voters’ preferences in every instance.202 Part
of the reason that legislators can legitimately depart from their constituents’ preferences from time to time is because the legislators are
accountable to the voters after the fact. Elected public officials are
supposed to lead, one might think, not only follow. The same is true
for elected judges. Moreover, the legitimacy of elected judges occasionally moving beyond the people’s current position is further bolstered by the fact that they (unlike legislators) have to provide the
voters with a reasoned explanation for their actions in the form of a
judicial opinion.
Even for those observers who are less concerned about conventional majoritarian and judicial-restraint-oriented objections and prefer
to defend the pro-gay-adoption decisions on more “meta-democratic”

200 Ind Const Art 7, §§ 10–11. See also Methods of Judicial Selection: Indiana; Selection of
Judges (American Judicature Society), online at http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state=IN (visited Nov 20, 2012).
201 See text accompanying note 196.
202 The question of how representatives should represent their constituents—where the
contrasting positions are usually described as the “delegate” and “trustee” models—is one that
has long generated debate. See generally Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (California 1967); Ethan J. Leib and David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Representation and Deliberative Engagement with Children, 20 J Polit Phil 178 (2012) (exploring the political theory debates about political representation).
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or deliberation-forcing or openly normative terms,203 elections should
still affect one’s assessment of the pro-adoption decisions. A judicial
decision that attempts to lead the people forward toward a more just
society carries the risk of provoking a legislative or popular backlash
that could render the decision self-defeating.204 Elected state judges,
who are close to and dependent upon the people and the political
process, should generally have a greater capacity to predict when
such a backlash is likely as compared to more isolated appointed
judges.205 Indeed, it might be normatively acceptable for elections to
be used to express that backlash, instead of creating more disruptive
reverberations throughout the political system.
An important caveat to the analysis above, and one that bears
repeating, is that judicial elections should matter to the extent that
they are meaningful events. Many times they are not.206 But sometimes they are. And the type of scenario represented by the adoption
problem, in which the issue is salient and relatively understandable,
seems like the kind of case in which elections could provide some
degree of genuine accountability, an accountability that justifies independence from legislators and even from the people.
***
Before closing this Section, it is worth noting the possibility of a
rupture between how elected judges are justified in acting and how
they might feel prudentially bound to act. We have argued on normative grounds that meaningful elections contribute to the legitimacy of judges acting in countermajoritarian ways. Nonetheless, as a
positive matter, it seems that heightened accountability would simultaneously dissuade judges from deviating too far from the people on
salient matters.207 Cast in its best light, this is reassuring, in that it
suggests that judges will use their normatively justified independence
with caution and will avoid the worst excesses of unaccountable
203 For such defenses, see Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation at 740–41 (cited in
note 5); Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 Chi Kent L Rev 933, 942–49 (2000).
204 There is a substantial literature on backlash, mostly focusing on constitutional decision
making. See, for example, Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104
Mich L Rev 431 (2005); Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism
and Backlash, 42 Harv CR–CL L Rev 373 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 Stan L Rev 155 (2007).
205 See Devins, 62 Stan L Rev at 1659–74 (cited in note 37). See also Part II.B.
206 See Part I.B.
207 See Pozen, 108 Colum L Rev at 326–27 (cited in note 146) (noting the irony that judicial elections legitimize countermajoritarian constitutional review in theory but create disincentives for judges to engage in it in practice).
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power. More ominously, though, it evokes fears about judges who
lack the strength to take unpopular action when necessary. That may
well be a reason to do away with judicial elections altogether (or to
be thankful that we also have life-tenured federal judges in the background). But if a jurisdiction decides to govern itself with elected
judges—genuinely elected judges—we cannot just assume that they
ought to behave like their federal counterparts and that every decision is just as proper regardless of who rendered it.
C.

Crossover Cases

As we think more carefully about the relevance of judicial elections for the interpretive enterprise, we must consider an important
but underappreciated feature of statutory interpretation. In our federal system, statutory interpretation involves various jurisdictional
crossovers. State court judges often interpret federal statutes and
federal court judges often interpret state statutes.208 On account of
choice-of-law regimes, state courts often interpret “foreign” state
statutes. Additionally, within a given state system, judges elected
from one district or locality must routinely interpret state laws
passed by representatives of a different and wider electorate; by the
same token, judges elected in at-large, statewide elections must interpret local laws that do not purport to bind the entire state.
These matters of “intersystemic statutory interpretation”209 raise
interesting and difficult questions for our current inquiry. For example: Should a federal judge tasked with interpreting state law eschew
whatever freedom elections might confer, even if elected state judges
might approach the same statute in a more liberated spirit? Ought a
state high court judge elected in a salient, partisan, and competitive
election use the freedom conferred by election to interpret federal
statutory law? And what should one set of state judges do when
208 See 28 USC § 1652 (“The laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”); Howlett v
Rose, 496 US 356, 367–75 (1990) (explaining that state courts are generally both permitted and
required to apply federal substantive law). See also Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L J 1898, 1926, 1960–62 (2011).
209 We credit Professor Gluck with coining the term but mean to use it in a more capacious sense than she does. See Gluck, 120 Yale L J at 1906 (cited in note 208). She focuses only
on the vertical federalism of federal-state interaction, whereas we are also concerned here with
horizontal interstate and vertical intrastate statutory interpretation problems. One of us explores these issues further. See Leib, 161 U Pa L Rev at *9–30 (cited in note 75). We also differ
from Professor Gluck in that she views intersystemic interpretation largely through the lens of
whether interpretive methodology is “law.” We prefer to draw more directly on considerations
of competence, democratic legitimacy, and pragmatism in order to identify circumstances in
which cross-system sensitivity is warranted.
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choice-of-law principles require them to interpret the law of a sister
state whose law is controlled by judges subject to a different selection scheme? This cluster of issues replicates itself in wholly intrastate scenarios as well: May a judge elected by a local (say, countylevel) constituency use whatever presumptive freedom election bestows when that local judge interprets not just a local ordinance but
also a statewide law enacted by the whole state’s legislature? And
may the state-level judges selected from larger constituencies impose
statewide policy when interpreting local law?
Admittedly, one could be forgiven for wanting to adopt the unified method for elected and appointed judges just to make these
practical puzzles disappear. Indeed, these challenging questions may
very well generate good reasons to reject interpretive divergence.
Still, our analysis thus far gives us the ability to make at least some
headway in this doctrinal morass.
1. Erie (and foreign state law).
The classic Erie context presents the puzzle in the most familiar
guise. Imagine a federal judge—appointed with life tenure by the
federal government—with jurisdiction over a case that requires the
federal judge to interpret a state statute. On account of prevailing
Erie doctrine, that federal judge must do her best to interpret the
state statute as the highest state court would.210 One might suppose
that means using state interpretive methods.211 Notice the problem
that arises for those who favor electorally driven interpretive divergence. We have argued that (some) elections license a type of decisional freedom for elective judiciaries that appointive judiciaries
lack—and we have emphasized an institutional competence to perform this work in elective judiciaries, which appointive judiciaries
210 See Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 78 (1938). There is academic commentary challenging whether Erie requires federal courts to “predict” state law (when it has not
already been decided by a state high court). See, for example, Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining
the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism after Erie, 145 U Pa L Rev
1459, 1461, 1495–1501 (1997); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L
Rev 651, 695, 707–15 (1995). But the federal courts more or less agree that they are supposed
to be taking that posture in Erie cases. See Gluck, 120 Yale L J at 1927 n 90 (cited in note 208)
(citing cases). See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 19 Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters § 4507 at 115–220 (West 2d ed
1996) (discussing how federal courts ascertain the content of state law).
211 A number of federal courts have stated that they should use state methods when interpreting state statutes. See, for example, Bass v County of Butte, 458 F3d 978, 981 (9th Cir
2006); General Electric Capital Corp v Southeastern Health Care, Inc, 950 F2d 944, 950 (5th Cir
1991). But one can also find numerous instances in which federal courts appear to ignore or
depart from that directive. See Gluck, 120 Yale L J at 1927–40 (cited in note 208).



01 BRUHL & LEIB ART (DO NOT DELETE)

1270

The University of Chicago Law Review

1/11/2013 8:27 AM

[79:1215

again lack. What is a federal court supposed to do when it is called
upon to stand in the shoes of the state judiciary yet lacks the competence to understand the constituency in the state?
Although we cannot make this problem disappear, it should not
be blown out of proportion. This complex issue arises only when
state law is unclear (for clear law triggers no decisional freedom even
for the elected state judge). Moreover, if the construction of the state
statute is controlled by recent precedent—or an obvious extension of
recent precedent—a federal court would ordinarily have little trouble simply following that established law. In a large class of these hypothetical cases, interpretive divergence simply will not arise on account of electoral status or otherwise, as the case will be an easy one
for all judges.
But some cases are not so simple. How should the federal judge
approach the difficult cases in which elections might matter? These
might be cases in which, for example, an unclear statute addresses a
matter of public interest or in which old precedent seems out of step
with contemporary trends. Although it is common for federal courts
in these more complex positions to use a variety of sources of authority to “predict” uncertain state law,212 the competence concerns
we adumbrated earlier make it particularly difficult for federal judges to predict unsettled state law when it is controlled by elected
judges who have specially designed decisional freedom. Although by
hypothesis state high courts can have the warrant and the competence to be dynamic, we doubt federal judges have the ability to approximate these dynamic virtues—and are better off not trying. Accordingly, in these circumstances, the procedural device of certifying
the question to the elected state high court seems like the most appealing option for a federal court that is being asked to perform a
task for which it is unsuitably designed.213 Alternatively, federal
courts at the very least need to formulate their Erie guesses with an
understanding about how elective judiciaries comport themselves

212 Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex L Rev 1, 20–21 (1994); Benjamin C. Glassman, Making State
Law in Federal Court, 41 Gonzaga L Rev 237, 299–303 (2006).
213 For an embrace of certification “solutions” (though for reasons having little to do with
our focus on interpretive divergence on account of different selection mechanisms), see Clark,
145 U Pa L Rev at 1549–56 (cited in note 210); Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 NYU L Rev 1293, 1299 (2003); Barry Friedman, Under the Law
of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases between Federal and State Courts, 104 Colum L Rev
1211, 1214, 1254–56 (2004).
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and with some sensitivity to the electoral dynamics surrounding state
court judicial elections.214
Consider next the plight of state judges—whether elected or appointed—who have to interpret a sister state’s law owing to choiceof-law principles.215 One would suppose that applying a statute of
State X does not mean applying the text in a vacuum but rather applying it as the State X judges would. Yet if the judges of State X interpret the law using (say) a measure of electorally justified and informed decisional freedom, the judges of other states (even if
elected) would lack the legitimacy and the information necessary to
wield that same power. For this reason, we regard it as unfortunate
that many of the states that authorize their supreme court to accept
certified questions from federal courts deny that option to the
courts of other states.216 Perhaps that would change—and existing
opportunities for certification would be used more often —were interpretive divergence to take hold. In any case, when certification is
unavailable, the second-best solution of judges muddling through
may be the only way forward.
All of this is untidy, we confess. But it bears reminding the reader that the potential for radical disuniformity in state law on account
of this particular complexity associated with interpretive divergence
is very small (and anyway there is plenty of divergence because of
other disparate methodological commitments across the states).
When important disuniformity arises—whether through federal exposition of state law via Erie or one state’s application of another
state’s law—it is always a state’s high court that ultimately controls
the development of its own state’s law. When other courts err in
their predictions about what a given statute requires, the state’s high
court can always clarify the law using whatever sources and methods
are appropriate given their local method of judicial selection.
214 In stating that federal judges should sometimes consider political factors when determining the content of state law, we acknowledge that some other scholars believe such a course
unduly compromises the ideal of law as impersonal and objective. See, for example, Dorf, 42
UCLA L Rev at 687–88 (cited in note 210); Gluck, 120 Yale L J at 1985–86 (cited in note 208).
But see Salve Regina College v Russell, 499 US 225, 241 (1991) (Rehnquist dissenting) (“A
[federal] judge attempting to predict how a state court would rule must use not only his legal
reasoning skills, but also his experiences and perceptions of judicial behavior in that State.”).
215 Thanks to Professor Howard Erichson for a good talk about these issues.
216 See Charles Alan Wright, et al, 17A Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and
Related Matters § 4248 n 33 at 497 (West 3d ed 2007). Where state-to-state certification is available, it has been very rarely used. See Ira P. Robbins, Interstate Certification of Questions of
Law: A Valuable Process in Need of Reform, 76 Judicature 125, 127 (1992) (reporting, as of
1992, that state-to-state certification had never been used). For a rare example of state-to-state
certification, see generally In re Certified Question from Fourteenth District Court of Appeals of
Texas, 740 NW2d 206 (Mich 2007).
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2. “Reverse-Erie.”
The “reverse-Erie” scenario217 presents somewhat different considerations. Here, we focus on what a state court should do when interpreting federal law. The issue is practically important: “[S]imply
by virtue of their numbers, state courts hear more federal-question
cases than do federal courts, and so these state cases have a significant effect on the meaning of federal law.”218 The deep question for
our analysis is what to think about the fact that some elected state
judges may enjoy some variety of interpretive freedom—and yet the
decisional freedom’s best justification derives from features of state
constitutional structure and pragmatic knowledge about state politics, state legislatures, and constituent preference. When the elected
state judge takes to interpreting federal law, can she bring that freedom into federal statutory construction?
It would seem reasonably clean to conclude that state judges
simply do not have the right democratic pedigree when it comes to
national legislation and ought to decline to use the interpretive freedom they won in a state election when they interpret federal statutes.219
The use of their decisional freedom in this context would be misplaced at best and could lead to disuniformity and forum shopping,
which is presumptively disfavored by the Erie ethos and general ruleof-law concerns.220
But, on the other side of the ledger, there is plenty of disuniformity—and interpretive divergence of many kinds—anyway. Further, it is hard to believe that an elected judge primed to respond to
constituents’ views would ignore those views just because federal law
is at issue. Asking elected judges to remove the “judico-cultural
vestment”221 granted by election for a class of important federal cases
may be a bit naive. As it is, most state courts do not feel constrained

217 See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 Notre Dame L Rev 1 (2006) (discussing the absence of a unified theory to explain when state law or federal law applies in state
court decisions).
218 Gluck, 120 Yale L J at 1960 (cited in note 208).
219 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr, State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59
Vand L Rev 1501, 1506–07, 1547, 1552, 1558 (2006) (finding, in a study of Founding-era state
practices, that state judges felt less free to engage in equitable interpretation when interpreting
federal statutes than when dealing with their own state statutes). Bellia’s explanation is based
not on judicial elections (which would not have been relevant in that period) but on the Supremacy Clause and related structural requirements for federal lawmaking.
220 See Erie, 304 US at 74–75; Clermont, 82 Notre Dame L Rev at 36 (cited in note 217).
221 Thanks to Professor James Brudney for the turn of phrase and the challenge here.

01 BRUHL & LEIB ART (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation

1/11/2013 8:27 AM

1273

to adopt constructions of federal law announced by any federal court
below the Supreme Court.222 And the sky has not fallen.223
In addition, there are good normative reasons to allow state judicial elections to have some small impact on the interpretation of
federal law. Although a state judge could not purport to represent a
national constituency, neither would the state court’s interpretation
of federal law extend outside its own state; this allows state judges to
satisfy local preferences while allaying concerns about overstepping
their electoral mandate. Moreover, locally elected judges can provide some valuable information to federal officials about how their
local constituents would prefer ambiguous statutes to be read and
implemented—and this may be precisely what the federalist design
of the United States would recommend. Electorally driven interpretive divergence thus provides fertile ground for the flourishing of an
attractive form of what others have called “dialectical federalism”224
or “polyphonic federalism.”225
It is true that the modest divergence we are inviting could contribute to intrastate (and interstate) forum shopping as between federal and state courts, a principal concern of the Erie doctrine. Neither court’s interpretations of federal law would be able to bind the
other, though the US Supreme Court could settle disputes definitively, at least in principle.226 Nonetheless, our provisional view on this
difficult subject is that the kind of decisional freedom authorized by
a relevant election does actually warrant a state judge to use that
small range of freedom even when interpreting federal law—at least
unless federal law settles on some principles of federal statutory interpretation that are sufficiently clear and sufficiently law-like that
state judges could be bound to follow them in the reverse-Erie scenario.227 That does not mean that state judges should ignore the risks
222 See Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State
Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 1143, 1173–76 (1999); Hall
v Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 851 A2d 859, 863–64 (Pa 2004) (collecting cases
and finding that a “vast majority of state supreme courts” do not hold lower federal court pronouncements on federal law to be binding).
223 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va L Rev 1567, 1584–1606, 1639 (2008).
224 Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 Yale L J 1035, 1046–47 (1977).
225 Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L Rev 243,
285 (2005); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal
Courts, 87 Cal L Rev 1409, 1466–67 (1999).
226 See 28 USC § 1257 (authorizing Supreme Court review of state court judgments on
federal law). Given the immense number of state decisions, the Supreme Court can review only a tiny fraction.
227 See Gluck, 120 Yale L J at 1961 (cited in note 208) (“[B]ecause there is no ‘law’ of federal statutory interpretation, as a formal matter, [ ] state courts are free to make methodological
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of intrastate disuniformity when the risks are compelling—after all,
their constituents would have second-order preferences for orderliness—but it means that uniformity is just one of the relevant values.
3. Local judges and state laws—and local laws and state judges.
There are, finally, a set of complexities that arise wholly within
individual states and relate to the enterprise of interpreting intrastate
statutory law.228 Within a given state, methods of judicial selection often vary depending on the level and type of court at issue. For instance, lower court judges may be seated by elections but higher
court judges may be appointed and then subject to retention election.229 In such a scenario, our analysis might suggest differential degrees of interpretive freedom—with the lower courts presumptively
having more freedom than higher courts. Can that be right? Moreover, even if all judges within a state are elected in the same type of
election, some will be elected by statewide constituencies while others will be elected by local units like counties or districts. Is it ultra
vires, then, for a locally elected judge to use decisional freedom
when interpreting state legislation rather than when she is interpreting county ordinances? And, in the Erie corollary, is it ultra vires for
state judges to use interpretive freedom when construing local laws
and ordinances when their electorate is not coterminous with the
electorate who voted in the representatives who passed the law under scrutiny? These are not easy problems with easy solutions, and
we do not purport to say how courts should behave in every intrastate crossover scenario.230 Nonetheless, we do offer a few comments
here in an exploratory spirit.

choices different from those of the lower federal courts.”). One area in which federal law might
have established such a binding interpretive rule is the Chevron doctrine governing review of
agency interpretations. See Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Inc v Columbia River Gorge
Commission, 213 P3d 1164, 1172 (Or 2009) (“Although [Chevron] deference is foreign to the
administrative law of this state, we are bound to apply it in our interpretation of federal statutes if the federal interpretive methodology so demands.”). For a discussion of whether Chevron is an appropriate model for elected judiciaries, see Part III.D.
228 See Leib, 161 U Pa L Rev at *9–30 (cited in note 75).
229 In California, for example, voters directly elect the lowest-level judges (Superior
Court) in nonpartisan elections. The judges at the higher-level appellate courts (the Courts of
Appeals and the Supreme Court) are seated through gubernatorial appointment and are then
subject to retention elections at regular intervals. See Judicial Selection in the States: California;
Overview (American Judicature Society), online at http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial
_selection/index.cfm?state=CA (visited Nov 20, 2012).
230 Our literature review reveals that although local government scholars have studied both
the political and constitutional dynamics that occur among local and state authorities, the judicial terrain internal to state systems—and their statutory interpretation practices, in particular—
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First, we suspect that local courts231 may not be the most promising sites for the exercise of decisional freedom—and this is so for a
variety of democratic, structural, and institutional reasons. Although
many judges on the lowest state courts are elected, very few such
elections give rise to any salience or any deliberation about real issues in the local electorate.232 Further, these elections are often controlled by political party machines.233 Except in the rare case of a
meaningful election that does not get captured by interest-group financing, local judicial elections could provide only a thin invitation
for interpretive creativity. Additionally, even where local elections
are genuine, one could question how much local autonomy the state
constitutional structure would allow them to confer. Unlike state authority, which is not regarded as deriving from the national government, the power of localities is usually regarded as deriving from a
grant of authority by the state.234 Finally, as a more practical matter,
the lowest-level judges within state systems are already the most
constrained in their statutory interpretation because they are the
ones most likely to be bound by precedent.
Having expressed those doubts, we do acknowledge that there is
something to be said in favor of decisional freedom at the local level,
in particular where local ordinances are at issue. Just as citizens can
is much less an object of careful analysis. One of us has started to get more systematic about
these issues. See Leib, 161 U Pa L Rev at *9–30 (cited in note 75).
231 “Local” courts here carries two meanings: local courts that are run by municipalities,
counties, or cities, and those run by the state directly at the local level.
232 See Charles A. Johnson, Roger C. Shaefer, and R. Neal McKnight, The Salience of
Judicial Candidates and Elections, 59 Soc Sci Q 371, 374 (1978) (finding that the salience of
lower-court elections—2.5 percent of voters surveyed could name a single candidate—is much
lower than higher-court elections: 14.5 percent of same).
233 See, for example, Lopez Torres v New York State Board of Elections, 462 F3d 161,
171–81 (2d Cir 2006) (describing the process for electing New York trial court judges as dominated by local party bosses), revd 552 US 196 (2008).
234 This is very contested territory within the state and local government law community,
but most acknowledge that local power flows from some state concession in a state statute or a
state constitution. See Gerald E. Frug, Richard T. Ford, and David J. Barron, Local Government Law: Cases and Materials 138 (West 5th ed 2010) (referring to “the dominant view” that
local governments “are dependent on state law delegations for any powers that they may exercise”). Even within the group that advocates for more extensive freedom for local governments, no one—to our knowledge—believes judicial federalism in particular is an especially
useful way to reinforce local political autonomy, though one could construct such an argument
from scholarship within the pro-local-autonomy tradition. See, for example, Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Supremacy, Local Sovereignty: Reconstructing State/Local Relations under the California Constitution, in Bruce E. Cain and Roger G. Noll, eds, Constitutional Reform in California: Making State Government More Effective and Responsive 401, 410–21 (Berkeley Institute
of Governmental Studies 1995) (providing an argument for expanded local power); Gerald E.
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv L Rev 1059, 1141–49 (1980) (emphasizing the importance of judicial federalism as a means of supervising state control of cities).
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use local school board elections to express their most important political views, local judicial elections may be a site for reinforcing political efficacy, too. Imagine a scenario in which a local judicial election is salient and focused on an issue of tremendous local concern
that is also the subject of statutory interpretation cases. Although cities and counties are rarely regarded as independent fonts of sovereignty, there may still be good reason to allow some play in the joints
for interpretive freedom by local judges in such cases. And there are
few risks when locally elected judges use decisional freedom to interpret only local law. The local judges can be corrected by their judicial superiors if they take whatever local mandate they have too
far, and the state legislature can always preempt local ordinances if it
wishes.235
It is a somewhat harder case if local judges purport to use their
decisional freedom to interpret statewide law. To be sure, the US Supreme Court has agreed that states may have an interest in “maintaining the link between a district judge’s jurisdiction and the area of residency of his or her voters.”236 State constitutional design may be open
to allowing locally elected judges to decide statutory cases in ways
that correspond to their electoral status. Indeed, just as “dialectical
federalism” can work on the national level,237 it might also have value
intrastate.
Still, such local judges must recognize their limits in terms of
democratic legitimacy and their practical abilities. Moreover, they
may be subject to direct review (and excoriation) by a higher court.
Here is an example:
We observe that one of the bases for the Juvenile Court’s . . .
order was [the local court’s] understanding of the policies of
Morgan County. . . . But county courts must be guided by state
law rather than local practice in carrying out their duties: “[a]
general statute, enacted by the people of the entire state
through their representatives, speaks for and to the whole population, and therefore cannot be given or be supposed to have a
merely local meaning, or a meaning varying to suit the special
usage prevailing in the several localities.” In fact, “[u]niformity
in the interpretation and application of the law is the keystone
in our system of jurisprudence.” Accordingly, the Juvenile
235 Intrastate preemption is commonplace—and state judges routinely use “implied”
preemption broadly. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 BU L Rev 1113, 1140–57 (2007).
236 Houston Lawyers’ Association v Attorney General of Texas, 501 US 419, 426 (1991).
Thanks to Professor Christopher Elmendorf for the lead.
237 See note 224.

01 BRUHL & LEIB ART (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation

1/11/2013 8:27 AM

1277

Court—and, indeed, all local courts—must base its decisions on
state law, and must also ensure that local practice complies with
state law.238
In short, even if local courts get creative with state law, infusing it
with local concern, we would expect to see state appellate courts trying to retain control over state law. These scenarios are quite different from the classic reverse-Erie case between state and federal authorities because within the framework of state and local governance,
the relationship here is hierarchical rather than coordinate.
It is also worth analyzing how state supreme court justices subject to at-large elections should think about their role when they take
to interpreting local laws, passed by representatives of subpopulations within their jurisdictions.239 This inquiry requires more attention
than we can give it here, requiring a rehearsal of all of the arguments
for intrastate polyphony and all the arguments against it from the
perspective of uniformity and the homogenizing function of state
law. Yet, given that the state tends to have hierarchical superiority
over its localities, we would expect state judges to bring statewide
policy preferences to bear on local ordinances freely and often. At
the very least, we hope our attention to the strongest arguments for
and against interpretive divergence has put these constellations of
difficult intrastate issues on the agenda for scholars of statutory interpretation to grapple with in the future.
D. Elected Judges and Deference to Agencies
We close with an example of a practical doctrinal payoff of attending to the role of judicial elections. In particular, we consider
how elections might affect the doctrines governing judicial deference
to administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations. In the federal
system, the familiar framework comes from the Supreme Court’s
Chevron decision, which instructs courts to defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of unclear statutory language, assuming the legislature

238 In the Matter of Infant Girl W., 845 NE2d 229, 244 (Ind App 2006), quoting Cook v
State, 59 NE 489, 490 (Ind App 1901) and Warren v Indiana Telephone Co, 26 NE2d 399, 405
(Ind 1940).
239 We focus on at-large, statewide races here—but there is also another complication:
What about the handful of state supreme courts whose members are elected from districts rather than by the entire state? See Bonneau and Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections at 12–13
table 1.2 (cited in note 18) (listing states). Should those judges act as local or instead statewide
officials with whatever freedom and obligations those respective roles involve? Given our
competence-based arguments in Part II.B, judges might be limited to using their freedom in
ways keyed only to their individual districts.
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actually delegated such interpretive authority to the agency.240 States
have their own administrative agencies, of course, and so the question naturally arises whether and how state courts should defer to
state administrative interpretations. Some recent work has tracked
what state courts are doing in reviewing the statutory interpretation
decisions of state agencies and has provided normative analysis of
what they ought to be doing.241 In what follows below, we explore
how judicial elections interact with—and disrupt—the rationales typically offered in support of a Chevron-like regime of deference.
We acknowledge at the outset that there can be other aspects of
state constitutional law—wholly separate from judicial selection
mechanisms—that bear on the appropriateness of a Chevron-like
deference regime. For example, some state constitutions contain
strong language prohibiting the delegation of legislative authority,242
which could be read to restrict deference. Nonetheless, most states
regard deference as a live option—about two-thirds of the states
have some form of deferential review243—so it is valuable to see how
Chevron’s rationales should play out when the judges are elected.
Let us say, to simplify, that Chevron is based on three basic justifications: (1) Unlike the federal executive agencies, federal judges lack
clean lines of political accountability; deference makes sense because
of the greater democratic credibility of executive agencies. (2) Unlike the federal executive agencies, federal judges lack the technical
expertise that is the core justification for the administrative control
of policy making in the first place; deference makes sense given the
courts’ incompetence on technical and scientific questions that occupy agency attention. (3) Unlike the federal executive agencies that

240

See Chevron, 467 US at 842–44.
See Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation at 1258–61 (cited in note 5); Michael
Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 McGeorge L Rev 977, 978, 984–87 (2008); D.
Zachary Hudson, Comment, A Case for Varying Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 119
Yale L J 373, 373, 378–80 (2009).
242 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 Vand L Rev 1167, 1191–1200 (1999).
243 About one-third of the states have a Chevron-like deference regime; about one-third
give “due deference,” coming shy of full Chevron deference; and about one-third perform de
novo review. See Pappas, 39 McGeorge L Rev at 1010–24 (cited in note 241). There is generally little correlation between the mode of judicial selection in a state and its deference regime.
See Hudson, Comment, 119 Yale L J at 381 n 30 (cited in note 241) (“[O]nly one-third of the
state judiciaries that are held directly democratically accountable refuse to show deference to
state agencies’ interpretive efforts.”). But these comparisons need to be kept in perspective: as
we explain below, it is inappropriate to assess states with judicial elections as a monolith. A
careful empirical inquiry would require analysis of the form of election, the salience of that
election, whether the agency at issue has an elected head, and the salience of that election.
241
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can act quickly and responsively to changing political and social
facts, the federal judiciary is a relatively slow and institutionally incompetent mechanism for updating statutes to conform with democratic mandates and material changes in the fabric of society.
It is, perhaps, relatively easy to see how each of these arguments
for Chevron deference runs into complications in the state environment. Take the accountability rationale for Chevron, and then consider that state court judges are, on average, politically accountable
in a way that federal court judges are not. Given that electoral pedigree, one cannot so readily say that these judges should defer to state
administrative agencies because they lack the agencies’ democratic
credibility.
But notice that although it may be tempting to recommend
abandoning deference in the states for this reason, the real lesson
here is that one has to embrace nuance when thinking about when
deference is indicated in the state courts. Unlike federal judges—
who are all appointed and are formally accountable only through
impeachment—state judges vary across states, and even within
states, in their degrees of political accountability.244 The category of
“judicial elections” hides important differences between forms of
electoral contests and the political salience of any one election. Thus,
although some class of elected judges should reject the Chevron decision rule—say, those subject to high-salience, partisan, and competitive judicial races for the highest courts in a state—others should
not immediately jump to the conclusion that deference should be
abandoned.245
Indeed, the accountability-based argument becomes yet more
interesting when one considers how state agency chiefs get their positions. The heads of some state agencies are directly accountable to
the electorate through separate elections, not just indirectly accountable through the removal and appointments powers of the

244 See Bruhl, 97 Cornell L Rev at 488–89 (cited in note 16) (discussing electoral differences across and within state judiciaries); Part I.B (discussing the degree of accountability associated with various electoral systems).
245 Our basic disagreement with the Hudson Comment is that it too often lumps states
together and assumes that “[s]tate judicial elections ‘routinely feature intense competition,
broad public participation, and high salience.’” Hudson, Comment, 119 Yale L J at 377 (cited
in note 241), quoting Pozen, 108 Colum L Rev at 265 (cited in note 146). Some races do have
these features and some do not—and election regimes and dynamics are so variable that it is
inadvisable to treat the question as a binary one. To the extent that Hudson’s core argument is
that Chevron should not be simplistically applied to all cases in the states, we agree. But our
analysis here is poised to address how to “tailor deference to variety.” United States v Mead
Corp, 533 US 218, 236–37 (2001).
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chief executive, as in the federal system.246 If the relevant agency
head were directly elected in a visible, competitive, and coherent
election, a lower-level judge who got her office through what is in
truth a patronage system might be required to defer, even if she had
been nominally elected, too. Deference might likewise be proper
when the judicial election is a low-salience retention vote. In sum,
Chevron’s reasoning cannot be applied neatly in the states, but it still
furnishes a framework to assess when deference might be appropriate for a state judge in a given case. The judge would need to evaluate the democratic credibility of her own election (if she were elected
at all) and the accountability mechanisms that control the state administrative agency.
A similarly nuanced account is available for Chevron’s second
principal justification, which draws on the comparative expertise of
(federal) administrative agencies over (federal) courts. Translating
Chevron to the state context requires one to consider the expertise of
state agencies and state courts. Regarding state agencies, there is
reason to believe that they are not quite as technically impressive
as their federal counterparts. State agencies generally have fewer
resources at their disposal and pay their officials less, and it may be
that corruption and capture are greater risks at the state level.247 Such
doubts about state administrative expertise tend to undercut the case
for deference. Yet when one turns to the state courts, it seems that
they too are less technically capable than their federal counterparts.
State judges work in a tougher institutional environment characterized by larger caseloads and fewer resources (money, law clerks, central support staff, and so forth).248 Add to those institutional factors
the delicate matter of whether state judges are, on average, of the
same ability of federal judges. Differences in the sheer numbers of

246 For discussions of the plural executive in state governance, see Daniel B. Rodriguez,
State Constitutional Failure, 2011 U Ill L Rev 1243, 1273–75; Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E.
Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U Chi L Rev 1385, 1386, 1399–1401 (2008); Steven G.
Calabresi and Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93
Minn L Rev 1696, 1697 (2009).
247 For suggestions along these lines, see Hudson, Comment, 119 Yale L J at 378–80 (cited
in note 241), citing Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of
the American Regulatory State 159–73 (Free Press 1992); Jerry L. Mashaw and Susan RoseAckerman, Federalism and Regulation, in George C. Eads and Michael Fix, eds, The Reagan
Regulatory Strategy: An Assessment 111, 115–22 (Urban Institute 1984). Other accounts portray
state administrative capabilities more favorably and emphasize that they have improved in recent decades. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L J 534, 552 (2011).
248 See Bruhl, 97 Cornell L Rev at 471–73 (cited in note 16); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 Harv L Rev 1105, 1121–24 (1977).
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positions to fill, together with the pay and prestige that accompany
them, tend to suggest a negative answer.249
Although state agencies and state courts both fall short of their
federal counterparts in terms of technical expertise, the real question
for purposes of determining the proper rule of deference is how the
state entities compare to each other.250 It seems to us quite likely that
state agencies fall short of federal agencies to a greater degree than
state courts fall short of federal courts. If that is so, then the “expertise gap”—the advantage agencies possess over courts—is smaller in
the states than in the federal government.251 State judges presented
with vigorous advocates on both sides of an issue (and a cultural
commitment to independence, judicial elections notwithstanding)
may do better than a locally captured and elected agency head, on
both technical questions and value determinations. The argument
against deference is all the more compelling when, as is often the
case, the state agency is not even dealing with matters that are technically complex.252 Therefore, although judges should defer when
they are out of their domains of expertise, there is good reason for
state judges to hesitate before embracing an across-the-board rule of
strong deference on an expertise rationale.
Considerations of relative institutional competence are also at
the core of the third justification for Chevron deference, which emphasizes agencies’ advantage in updating statutes. The fact of judicial
elections invites the claim that deference to state agencies is unnecessary for updating statutes because elected judges have the relevant
competence to perform the task themselves. Indeed, as we explored
in Part II, elected judges of many kinds (whether subject to retention
elections or partisan contests) have incentives to familiarize themselves with popular sentiment. State judges subject to elections are,
unlike their federal counterparts, poised “to know what the issues of

249

See Neuborne, 90 Harv L Rev at 1121–22 (cited in note 248).
Other cross-institutional comparisons would be relevant for different doctrinal questions. For example, the relative expertise of federal versus state agencies might be relevant
when a court confronts competing interpretations of a statute issued by two agencies, one state
and the other federal. For an interesting investigation of this problem, see Gluck, 121 Yale L J
534, 598–605 (cited in note 247).
251 Expertise may be a function not only of scientific or technical knowledge but also of
sheer manpower. In the federal context, the administrative state has hundreds of thousands of
people to decide and implement policy; the federal courts have mere hundreds. The state systems have much more parity between court personnel and agency personnel. We thank Professor Rick Hills for this insight.
252 See, for example, Hudson, Comment, 119 Yale L J at 378–79 (cited in note 241) (arguing that state agencies tend to deal with issues that are on average less complicated than the
issues dealt with by federal agencies).
250
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public debate were when state legislation was proposed, what the
state legislature thought it was doing when it passed the legislation,
and what the situation in the State was before and after that legislation was passed.”253
If the updating-focused rationale for Chevron is couched in
terms of presumed congressional intent to put agencies in charge of
managing policy, that justification does not translate easily to the
states either. Because judicial-legislative ties tend to be closer in the
states than at the federal level, a state legislature is less likely to intend to cut the politically accountable judiciary out of the interpretive equation—hence, less justification for a background presumption that delegations flow primarily to agencies.254 Quite routinely,
state legislatures legislate against background knowledge that state
courts use the common law to effect policy making. Legislatures can,
of course, abrogate the common law. But unlike the federal judicial
system, which is not set up to develop common law subjects over
time,255 the state judiciary is already assumed to be a policy maker in
many statutory domains.256
In sum, all three justifications that are commonly offered in support of Chevron deference in federal courts fail as justifications for a
blanket Chevron-like decision rule for the states. But the justifications—along with the analysis in this Article considering the arguments for and against interpretive divergence—point the way toward
a more principled and nuanced set of guideposts for how state judges
should seek to review state administrative statutory interpretation
decisions.

253 Marcia L. McCormick, When Worlds Collide: Federal Construction of State Institutional Competence, 9 U Pa J Const L 1167, 1198 (2007). For an argument in support of state judge
competence in updating statutes, see Kaye, 70 NYU L Rev at 18–34 (cited in note 98).
254 See, for example, Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Methodology as Model; Model as Methodology,
47 Willamette L Rev 575, 583–86 (2011) (arguing that Chevron’s view that ambiguity equals
delegation to the agency is inappropriate in Oregon because the state judges are elected and
are in closer dialogue with the state legislature).
255 See City of Milwaukee v Illinois, 451 US 304, 312–13 (1981).
256 This is why many state cases in common law subject areas engage in dynamism without
much pushback from legislatures. See, for example, Li v Yellow Cab Co, 532 P2d 1226, 1230 (Cal
1975) (torts). And consider any contract case under the Uniform Commercial Code, which essentially treats the Code as mere common law. For more on the interaction of common law adjudication and statutory regimes, see Pojanowski, 91 Tex L Rev at *15–20 (cited in note 16). For
a more skeptical take on legislative meta-intent to enable judges to develop statutory law in a
common law method, see Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to
Courts: Are “Common-Law Statutes” Different? *2, in Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed, Intellectual
Property and the Common Law (forthcoming Cambridge 2012), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2042146 (visited Nov 20, 2012).
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CONCLUSION
For too long, most scholars of legisprudence have appeared to
embrace without much reflection a unified model of statutory interpretation, according to which elected and appointed judges are supposed to approach statutory text in identical ways. There is much to
be said for that view—but the justifications for it have not been fully
articulated before. We hope that if this Article accomplishes nothing
else beyond reinforcing a conventional view, we have explained the
appeal of that view and placed it on firmer ground. Still, our exploratory study here has also attempted to make the best case for a more
controversial but also plausible and intuitive view: that judicial elections of certain kinds can justify certain types of interpretive divergence between elected and appointed judges. We have tried not only
to explain and defend that view but also to explore some of its limits.
By distinguishing among different types of elections, we are able
to supply a more nuanced account of the normative significance of
elections for the enterprise of statutory interpretation. And by exploring different kinds of cases—from cases that touch upon matters
of clear public concern to cases that implicate public-choice problems in the legislature, from crossover cases where a judge subject to
one selection mechanism must speak on the law of a jurisdiction that
uses a different selection mechanism to cases involving agency interpretations—we are able to show how attending to the distinctive features of elective judiciaries can enrich our understanding of how
judges ought to do their jobs. We know there is much more to say
about our subject; we wanted first to set out the terms of debate,
demonstrate its interest and complexity, and highlight the conflicting
values that are at stake.



